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SOFT AND HARD STRATEGIES: THE ROLE OF
BUSINESS IN THE CRAFTING OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
Susan Block-Lieb
What motivates the choice between hard and soft law in the drafting of
international commercial law, and what role does business play in the pref1
erence between the two? Broad disagreement exists in international relations (“IR”) and international law (“IL”) commentary as to motivations for
reliance on soft international law. Traditionally, this commentary casts a
wide gaze across efforts to draft both international public and private law.
This Article instead argues that narrowing the focus of the conversation to
consider only international commercial lawmaking sharpens the debate
about the use of hard and soft law. In the past, this debate focused only on
states’ interests in crafting international law. Shifting the conversation to
look specifically at international commercial lawmaking invites examination of the involvement of both public and private actors. It particularly invites examination of the “mechanisms, extent and effect” of participation by
private commercial actors—businesses, financial institutions, and the inter2
national associations that represent their interests—in this process.
IR and IL literatures mostly distinguish between hard and soft international law along three dimensions—obligation, precision, and delegation—
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thanks to John Pottow and all the participants in the University of Michigan Law School conference on “The Role of Soft Law in International Insolvency and Commercial Law.” I am
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2020, and the staff at the MJIL for all their support and assistance.
1.
I use the phrase “international commercial law” in this Article to refer to a subset of
international private law governing commercial transactions involving trade in goods and services, including the law governing the transport of such goods and the payment and financing
for the payment of such goods. The phrase is sometimes used to cover the law governing a
broader range of financial transactions than those dedicated to the purchase of goods; it is also
mostly limited to transactions between businesses and thus excludes consumer protection
laws. I do not look to resolve either ambiguity in this Article. This cluster of issues currently
engages the lawmaking efforts of several global lawmakers: the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (which refers to itself as “UNIDROIT”), and the Hague Conference on Private
International Law. For deeper analysis of these international organizations and their lawmaking efforts, see SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF GLOBAL MARKETS (2017). This usage modernizes the phrase “trade law” initially used by UNCITRAL. Id. at 1 n.1.
2.
For a similar inquiry into the role of businesses, albeit their role in the making of
multilateral treaties—that is, “hard” international laws, see Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of
Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264 (2016).
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that, together, describe the concept of legalization. In this context, “obligation” asks whether states are bound to a rule such that a failure of compliance would subject them to scrutiny under the rules and procedures of inter4
national law; “precision” means that the “rules unambiguously define the
5
conduct they authorize, require or proscribe[;]” “[d]elegation” refers to the
notion that the states obligated under such precise rules have also agreed to
be bound to some dispute mechanism granted authority to implement, inter6
pret, and apply those rules. An international obligation is said to be cast in
“hard” law, therefore, if there is no wiggle room either in terms of whether a
state is bound by a clearly articulated obligation or in terms of how states
can be made to carry out such obligations. In contrast, international legislation is described as “soft” either if it is imprecise, imposes no obligation, or
fails to specify how these precise obligations can be enforced against noncompliant states. How to enforce international legislation is the difficult
part: if states are sovereign, then, by definition, they cannot be made to do
anything they do not want to do.
On the basis of this definition, different schools of thought take issue
with different aspects of soft law. Positive legal scholars like Prosper Weil
7
and Jan Klabbers have little use for soft law, viewing it as “destabiliz[ing],”
8
9
“detrimental,” or, at the very least, logically flawed. Rational institutionalists differ. They see a realist’s logic to non-binding soft laws, emphasizing
that soft international law permits states to identify and signal their interests
for international actors and perhaps lay out the possibility for future com10
mitments. Andrew Guzman, for example, argues that states rationally
3.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000) (developing the concept of “legalization” in distinguishing
between hard and soft international law); see also Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of
Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000) (expanding upon the definition of “legalization”);
Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 21, 30 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (adopting a similar six
factor test for soft/hard law).
4.
David M. Trubek et al., ‘Soft Law’, ‘Hard Law’, and EU Integration, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 65, 69 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2006).
5.
Abbott et al., supra note 3, at 401 (italicization omitted).
6.
Trubek et al., supra note 4, at 69–70.
7.
See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT’L L. 413, 423 (1983).
8.
Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 381, 383
(1998).
9.
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 713 (2010) (describing positive legal scholars as viewing soft international law as “logically flawed” and
citing Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 181 (1996) (advocating retention of the “traditional binary conception of law”)).
10.
See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L
ORG. 495, 508–13 (1991) (referring to “binding” international law as a “misleading hyperbo-
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choose soft law to minimize the reputational costs that may result from a
11
potential violation of law, whether due to uncertainty or otherwise. Without being constrained by some enforceable international commitment, these
commentators argue, a rational state may announce its interests through soft
law formats that are intended more to communicate preferences and intentions than to establish enforceable commitments; a state’s decision to format
its statement of intentions in the form of a treaty is, say rationalists, a way
for nations to signal their relative seriousness about a topic.
By contrast, constructivists like David Trubeck focus less on the drafting and enforcement of an international agreement and more on its imple12
mentation. Constructivists’ sociological perspective on soft international
law addresses “the gap between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-action”
and emphasizes soft law’s impact on states’ behavior rather than states’ ob13
ligations. Pragmatists like Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack similarly
14
take a long view when considering the benefits of soft laws. They argue
that “actors, working ex ante, use agreements having different characteris15
tics to further particular aims.” They also emphasize that “[t]hese different
types of agreements can have unpredicted effects, ex post, leading to new
16
cycles of international lawmaking.” This focus on the recursive cycles of

le.” But, describing the usage of “binding” as one that matters since it signals a nation’s willingness to commit reputational capital to an international agreement).
11.
Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.
579, 582 (2005) [hereinafter, Guzman, Design]; see also ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 71–111 (2008) (arguing that,
when states enter agreements, they want their promises to be credible).
12.
See Trubek et al., supra note 4, at 75 (distinguishing rationalist and constructivist
scholars’ perspectives on soft law and finding that “constructivist scholars look at how institutions facilitate constitutive processes such as persuasion, learning, argumentation, and socialisation”).
13.
Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 713 (describing constructivist schools of
thought); see also Trubek et al., supra note 4, at 75 (same, specifically as relates to European
lawmaking).
14.
See Shaffer & Pollack, D note 9, at 728 (“examin[ing] the problem of implementing
international agreements, [and] arguing that implementation challenges set off recursive cycles of international lawmaking, with hard and soft law sometimes being used as complements
and sometimes as antagonists.”).
15.
Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 714.
16.
Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 714. Shaffer and Pollack’s reference to the long
view in theories of international law harkens to Carruthers and Halliday’s theory of recursivity. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 742–43; see also TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE
G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT (2009) (relying on recursivity theory in describing international
efforts to set corporate insolvency law standards in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis);
BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1998) (same). In
subsequent work, Halliday and Shaffer together elaborate on the influence of recursivity in the
making of what they refer to as “transnational legal orders”—also referred to as “TLOs.” For
an extensive definition of a TLO, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, ch. 1, at 31–34 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2016). Halliday and I also write about recursivity
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lawmaking also led Halliday and me to argue that soft laws are often part of
an incremental strategy of soft law implementation in which hard laws may
follow the enactment of soft laws and that states may weave soft and hard
17
laws together to broaden the reach of lawmaking initiatives.
Most of the existing IR and IL commentary—from positivists, rational
institutionalists, and constructivists—focuses exclusively on a state-centered
set of contentions. It focuses on states’ interests in soft law for international
coordination and leaves out any question of private interests in the promulgation of soft international law. Although this analysis is widely applied to a
18
variety of international and transnational laws, whether public or private,
this commentary mostly ignores businesses’ interests in international law19
making.
The focus on states’ interests in the choice between soft and hard international law is not surprising: for over one hundred years, conventional IL
theory has asserted that international law is made wholly by states negotiating in their own national interests and that businesses influence states’ in20
ternational lawmaking efforts only indirectly through domestic channels.
From this perspective, states may or may not incorporate these market interests made known to them through domestic channels; economic actors are
viewed as helpless to press their case in international settings.

and TLO theory in our book, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS. See BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra
note 1, at 23–31.
17.
Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms and Global Lawmaking,
32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 854 n.9 (2007).
18.
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172 (2010) (“Language included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy, decisions of the
UN Human Rights Committee, and rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), are
thought to impact states because of their quasi-legal character.”); Shaffer & Pollack, supra
note 9, at 752–65, 790–98 (drawing examples from WTO trade law, international laws governing genetically modified food, finance, environmental protection of biodiversity, human
rights, and trade in cultural products).
19.
For counterexamples of commentary focused on business’ intervention in global
lawmaking efforts, see, for example, BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1; JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 27 (2000); Durkee, supra
note 2; Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63 (2013); Melissa J. Durkee,
International Lobbying Law, 127 YALE L.J. 1742 (2018); Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business
Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. L. REV. 147, 172 (2009). For counterexamples of commentary focused on businesses’ involvement in transnational private standard
setting, see, for example, NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (Anne Peters et al.
eds. 2009).
20.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 341 (1905) (“Since the Law
of Nations is a law between States only and exclusively, States only and exclusively are subjects of the Law of Nations.”); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470–83 (2005) (surveying
foundations of international legal theory, including the primacy of the state); Developments in
the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1228 (2011) (tracing notion of the primacy of nation-states in international lawmaking to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648).
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Increasingly, however, this concentration on states as the only legitimate influence in the making of law, whether domestic or international, has
21
been criticized as “an outdated theory.” Recent scholarship has begun to
question the primacy of nation-states and their national interests in the mak22
ing of international law. Some of this criticism is the result of empirical
work demonstrating that the state-centric focus of conventional IL theory is
23
either inaccurate or at least incomplete. These empirical studies find that
businesses influence IL indirectly at the domestic level, to be sure, but also
more directly by accessing international organizations (“IOs”) and transnational regulatory networks (“TRNs”) both as observers and as participants in
the lawmaking process.
In our book, Terence Halliday and I demonstrate broad involvement
within the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
24
(“UNCITRAL”) by delegations of non-state actors. Our observations involve three case studies within UNCITRAL (insolvency, secured transac25
tions, and international transport law), but others have studied non-state
26
influences across a broader range of international lawmaking. For example, John Braithwaith and Peter Drahos study thirteen areas of global business law and found that business actors invariably took leading roles in the
27
formation of this law. Based on two additional case studies (the Cape
Town Convention on securing international interests in mobile equipment,
like aircraft and rolling stock, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade
agreement), Melissa Durkee similarly contends that businesses “form transnational coalitions, address their concerns directly to international lawmakers who are not subject to domestic political checks, and assume lawmaking
28
roles previously held only by states.”

21.
Durkee, supra note 2, at 267.
22.
See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 19, at 27 (2000) (widely studying
global business regulation and concluding, among other things, that “[t]he most recurrently
effective actors in enrolling the power of states and the power of the most potent international
organization (e.g. the WTO and IMF) are large US corporations.”); Durkee, supra note 2
(studying the role of business actors in treaty formation generally and in particular in the case
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Cape Town Convention); Shaffer, supra note 19, at 172
(concluding that “[b]usinesses play a critical role in international and transnational law, which
has spread, directly or indirectly, to most regulatory areas.”).
23.
Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
24.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALIDAY, supra note 1.
25.
Id. at 4–7, 96–150.
26.
Durkee, supra note 2, at 266.
27.
BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra note 19.
28.
Durkee, supra note 2, at 268. Unlike Halliday and I, who focus both on
UNCITRAL’s hard and soft international law products, Durkee concentrates her analysis on
the business of treaties—that is, the involvement of business actors in treaty negotiations and
the effect of this participation in the content and the success or failure of this hard law. Id. at
287–88.
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These empirical studies stand on the shoulders of earlier theoretical
commentary that questions the notion that states, and states alone, are and
should be involved in international lawmaking. This modern theory looks to
account for sub-state and possibly non-state actors’ involvement in the conceptualization, drafting, implementation, and enforcement of international
legislation. International liberal theory, for example, studies the role of sub29
national actors in international relations and international law. Network
and global legal pluralism theories focus on the influences of sub-national
30
epistemic communities in international lawmaking. The global administrative law project argues that both public and private actors have roles in the
administration of international law and looks to account for the involvement
31
of these sub-national and non-state actors. Transnational legal order theory
also examines the involvement of state, sub-state, and non-state actors but
expands this focus to actors located in international, national, or local contexts and broadly considers the alignment, settling, and institutionalization
32
of legal texts among these fields. Market theories of private standard setting focus on non-state actors’ involvement in transnational self-regulation

29.
See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997) (elaborating liberal theory in international relations; explaining that domestic constituencies construct state interests); Oona A.
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1961 (2002)
(through international liberal theory, considering the role of sub-state and non-state actors in
developing and implementing human rights treaties because the theory “opens the black box
of the state.”); Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167, 168–70 (1999) (viewing sovereign nations as agents of small interest groups and, thus,
questioning the Westphalian model of IL); Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 (2004) (arguing that domestic interest groups
sometimes attempt to set domestic policy and develop domestic law through international
agreement).
30.
For the classic work on network theory in international law (“IL”), see ANNEMARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). For that of global legal pluralism, see
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND
BORDERS (2012); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155
(2007). See also, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2603, 2656 (1997) (describing the influence of epistemic communities of
government officials, NGOs, “transnational moral entrepreneurs[,]” and business entities
working transnationally to entrench patterns of behavior and generate norms to solidify these
patterns).
31.
See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,
68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20 (2005) (discerning “[f]ive main types of globalized administrative regulation[,]” other than treaty laws, including some “administration by private institutions with regulatory functions.”).
32.
See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory
Shaffer eds., 2015) (describing the aim of the transnational legal order theory as “reframing
the study of law and society in today’s world from a predominantly national context . . . to a
perspective that places processes of local, national, international, and transnational public and
private lawmaking and practice in dynamic tension within a single analytic frame.”).
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and standard setting more than states’ involvement in international lawmak33
34
ing per se or international law more generally.
Although conventional analyses of hard and soft international law fail
to account for the distinct goals of soft international law in private, commercial contexts, these commercial law contexts present an important locus
35
of international law study. Specifically, emphasis on international commercial law provides a basis for examining the role that business interests
can and do play in producing and implementing hard and soft commercial
laws and the special usefulness of soft international law to private, commercial entities.
This Article proceeds to fill these gaps in three steps. Part I returns to
the classic definition of hard international law initially put forward by Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal and related IR scholars and analyzes existing commercial law treaties in light of this definition. It concludes that virtually none of these commercial law treaties constitute “hard” international
law because nearly all commercial law treaties rely on national courts for
enforcement. But Abbott and Snidal’s focus on the extent to which international law is legalized—and especially the extent to which it is enforced by
international actors—may matter less with commercial than other more public international lawmaking. This is because the mostly private law governing commercial transactions conceives of obligation and enforcement in
ways distinct from its public law counterparts.
Part II explains the distinction between private and public laws that
govern purely domestic commerce. Many commercial transactions are not
governed by regulatory legislation imposing “top down” obligations enforced by the state but rather contractual obligations that are self-regulating
33.
See, e.g., NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS, supra note 19; KRISTINA
TAMM HALLSTRÖM, ORGANIZING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION: ISO AND THE IASC
IN QUEST OF AUTHORITY (2004); Panagiotis Delimatsis, Global Standard-Setting 2.0: How
the WTO Spotlights ISO and Impacts the Transnational Standard-Setting Process, 28 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 273 (2018); Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards:
Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1, 7 (2003).
34.
See, e.g., Natasha Affolder, The Market for Treaties, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 159, 159
(2010) (observing that business entities rely on treaties for their private interests); Durkee,
supra note 2, at 316–18 (analyzing the regulation of corporate participation in treaty making
through the lens of both an administrative and market theory); NON-STATE ACTORS AS
STANDARD SETTERS, supra note 19, at xix (edited volume providing “broad insight into the
multifaceted world of standard setting by non-state actors.”); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (2011) (noting the increased role of private actors, including multinational corporations and other businesses, in international lawmaking
and exploring the possible effects of such participation).
35.
Others have written on the distinct role that soft international law plays in regulating global financial institutions and financial markets. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW
AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2d ed. 2015);
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW (Andrea K. Bjorklund & August Reinisch
eds., 2012); THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE
ROLE OF SOFT LAW (Friedl Weiss & Armin J. Kammel eds., 2015). On the distinction between commercial, financial, and other sorts of economic law, see supra note 1.
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and mostly self-enforcing. In the absence of mandatory commercial regulation, businesses assert their interests domestically through privately organized contracts and litigation brought to enforce these contracts as well as
through political pressure for reform of judicial administration. Where regulation does exist or has been proposed, businesses may also look to influence this regulation by lobbying legislators and executives.
Part III considers the implications of commercial lawmaking for international settings and, in particular, state and non-state (that is, business) in36
terests in the production of international versions of such laws. State sovereignty interests vary depending on the type of international commercial
law reform proposed, whether regulatory or otherwise; business’ autonomy
37
interests also vary along this axis. These interests may diverge, although
the interests of states and businesses are also interconnected and subject to
38
change based on assertions of influence. Soft law may aid in bridging
these differences in various ways—through its gap-filling, advocacy, and
socializing functions. Businesses are uniquely capable of fulfilling these
functions through soft international law, capabilities that Part III explores
both with reference to the detail of various international commercial laws
and with regard to broader theoretical concerns.

I. International Commercial Laws and Their “Legalization”
Abbott and Snidal view only precise obligations subject to enforcement
by an international court or other binding dispute resolution mechanism as
sufficiently legalized to qualify as hard international law. Hardly any international agreements on topics of commercial law would satisfy Abbott and
Snidal’s test for hard law, specifically the aspect of their test regarding del39
egation and objectively certain enforcement of international treaties. This
36.
Soft law commentators mostly consider the role of soft international law in mitigating conflicts between states and thus as complementing or supplementing hard international
laws. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Reviewing the Use of “Soft Law” in Investment Arbitration,
7.2 EURO. INT’L ARB. REV 149 (2018); Guzman & Meyer, supra note 18; Guzman, Design,
supra note 11; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9. Shaffer and Pollack have also written extensively on the potential for hard and soft international laws to interact as antagonists. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 743–52, and 788–98. When Shaffer and Pollack view this antagonism as between actors, they mostly talk in terms of states’ interests diverging. But see
Shaffer, supra note 19. In this Article, I too hold out the possibility that states hold divergent
interests from business and other private participants in international lawmaking.
37.
For a discussion of hard and soft law as antagonists, see Shaffer and Pollack, supra
note 9, at 765–84, 788–98.
38.
See id. at 722–27 (noting that soft law commentators focus more on the ways in
which hard and soft law interact as complements).
39.
As noted above, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal distinguish among harder or
softer international instruments on the grounds of their “legalization”—that is, (i) the precision of the rules; (ii) the obligation they create for implementing states; and (iii) whether the
rules delegate resolution of disputes arising under their terms to a third-party decisionmaker or
enforcement agent. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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is not because there is a dearth of commercial law treaties to have entered
into force, however.
There are numerous longstanding private law treaties governing a wide
40
range of procedural topics. The New York Convention (1958), which governs enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, is a multilateral treaty that enjoys nearly unparalleled ratification by countries around the globe. The
Hague Conference on Private International Law promulgated a number of
treaties on topics that range from service of process, evidence, enforcement
41
of choice of court clauses, and so on. In addition to this international
commercial law governing procedural topics, there are more than a handful
of treaties governing the substance of specific commercial transactions, such
as the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
relating to Bills of Lading, commonly referred to as the Hague Rules
42
(1924), the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
43
Sale of Goods, also known as the CISG (1978), and the Convention on In40.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
7, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
41.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (sometimes referred to as
“HCCH”) describes itself as “The World Organisation for Cross-Border Co-operation in Civil
and Commercial Matters.” See HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/
en/home (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). Perusal of the international instruments it has promulgated over the past century clarifies that the term “matters” refers to litigation between private
parties and that its core mission involves coordination of the procedural rules followed in such
litigation. For a list of these instruments, see Conventions, Protocols and Principles, HAGUE
CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions (last visited Apr.
8, 2019).
42.
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Hague Rules]. Nearly one hundred years have passed since the Hague Rules entered into force, and enormous changes in the
shipping industry have rendered many of its provisions outdated. See BLOCK-LIEB &
HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 99–100. As a result, states have sought to revise it, but treaty revision is exceedingly difficult with a treaty that has been agreed to as broadly as the Hague
Rules have. The most successful of these revisions, the Visby Protocols, have been ratified by
dozens of nations. For a discussion of the Visby Protocols, see BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY,
supra note 1, at 99–107. But dissension is widespread, especially among less economically
developed nations. UNCITRAL sought to redress states’ concerns with the Hague Rules’ lack
of modernity and carrier focus with its production of the Hamburg Rules in the late 1970s, and
several states’ ratification of this draft treaty means that these too have entered into force.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 100. Technical advances in the shipping industry
and shifts in the economics of shipping prompted subsequent pressure for modernization of
the Hague-Visby Rules with a new draft convention on international transport. BLOCK-LIEB &
HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 102–04. UNCITRAL recently promulgated its United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea,
Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdam_rules/RotterdamRules-E.pdf [hereinafter Rotterdam Rules]. Although roughly 20 countries signed this convention, only three ratified it. As a result, the Rotterdam Rules have not (yet?) entered into
force. For a discussion of the Rotterdam Rules, see BLOCK-LIEB AND HALLIDAY, supra note
1, at 236–41.
43.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
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ternational Interest in Mobile Equipment, known as the Cape Town Con44
vention (2000).
All of these conventions, whether procedural or substantive, rely on na45
tional courts for their enforcement. Without international provision for
their enforcement, these conventions would not be sufficiently legalized to
be considered hard law under the definition set out by Abbot and Snidal.
Moreover, the CISG widely permits private parties otherwise subject to its
terms to simply decide that they do not like its provisions and thus opt out
by saying as much in their contracts. This kind of opt-out provision, sometimes also referred to as a default rule, while ordinary in some domestic law
contexts, is unusual in international law and is highly controversial in some
46
academic circles. A convention that can be avoided through a contractual
opt-out would hardly seem an “obligation” in the sense put forward by Abbott and Snidal. Moreover, nearly all of these treaties govern contractual relationships of one kind or another. As a result, the obligations that they impose are conditional on the conclusion of some initial private agreement.
International commercial law consists of more than just these “nearly
hard” multilateral conventions. International organizations (“IOs”) have also
widely promulgated non-binding legal texts concerning commercial and financial markets, mostly in the form of precisely drafted model laws or model legal provisions but also sometimes in the form of broad statements of
principle offered to guide future legislation or regulation on a topic. States
have implemented some of this soft international commercial law, for example, by enacting domestic legislation based on these international models
47
or inspired by these principles. Examples of this soft international law
demonstrate the breadth of this range of commercial topics.
In our recent book, Global Lawmakers, Terence Halliday and I found
that UNCITRAL has relied on soft law instruments since its inception in issue areas as varied as commercial dispute resolution, e-commerce, pro44.
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001,
T.I.A.S. No. 06-301.2, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention].
45.
See, e.g., Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, supra note 19. The Cape Town Convention
(“CTC”) creates an international registry for international interests in mobile equipment, however. By internationalizing implementation of its mandatory rules and setting up this international registry, the Cape Town Convention may limit the grounds on which national courts
can undermine enforcement of its mandates.
46.
See generally Gilles Cuniberti, Is the CISG Benefiting Anybody?, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1511 (2006); Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
International Sales Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446 (2005); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility
of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743
(1999). The CISG is not unique in this regard. For example, the draft Rotterdam Rules would
allow parties to enter into “volume contracts” that would not, based on such an agreement,
otherwise be subjected to specified mandatory provisions in this draft convention once it enters into force. Rotterdam Rules, supra note 42, art. 80.
47.
For collections of essays on these topics, see, for example, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW, supra note 35; THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF SOFT LAW, supra note 35.
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curement, project finance, insolvency, and secured transactions law. We
also found that, over its fifty-year history, UNCITRAL “invented” and
adopted many types of soft law when drafting international standards, including: rules; model laws and model legal provisions; model contract provisions; recommendations; legal guides; notes; legislative guides; practice
49
guides; and reports.
UNCITRAL is not unique in its reliance on soft international law on
50
commercial and financial topics. Although the International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) promulgated only draft conventions between its re-emergence after World War II and the 1990s, it has
51
increasingly relied on soft law formats such as model laws and principles.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law, which, until recently,
worked exclusively on producing draft conventions and protocols, also
promulgated a set of Principles on Choice of Law in International Commer52
cial Contracts in 2015. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) and other IOs that focus on reforming sovereign
debt lending and restructuring practices have similarly published principles
53
on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing, although, in the past,
UNCTAD legislative projects mostly centered on producing draft conven54
tions. The G-20, and the numerous lawmaking IOs and TRNs it relies on
to build out its financial architecture project, have endorsed principles on a
55
wide range of financial and economic issues. Indeed, some commentators

48.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 65–82.
49.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 80–82.
50.
See BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 80; Susan Block-Lieb & Terence
Halliday, Contracts and Private Law in the Emerging Ecology of International Lawmaking, in
CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION IN
GLOBAL MARKETS 350 (Grégoire Mallard & Jérôme Sgard eds., 2016) [hereinafter BlockLieb & Halliday, Emerging Ecology].
51.
See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Emerging Ecology, supra note 50, at 352.
52.
Block-Lieb & Halliday, Emerging Ecology, supra note 50, at 383.
53.
ANNA GELPERN, HARD, SOFT, AND EMBEDDED: IMPLEMENTING PRINCIPLES ON
PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING (2012), https://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc2_en.pdf (written for United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”)); MATTHIAS GOLDMANN, RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN
LENDING AND BORROWING: THE VIEW FROM DOMESTIC JURISDICTIONS (2012),
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc3_en.pdf (a comparative survey
written for UNCTAD); Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Matthias Goldmann, An Incremental Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle of Public International Law, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 13, 23–26 (2016).
54.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 377–80.
55.
For a discussion of the G-20’s high-level principles on financial consumer protection, financial inclusion, financial education, and other topics, see Susan Block-Lieb, Consumer Financial Protection, Inclusion, and Education: Connecting the Local to the Global, in
LAW BETWEEN BUILDINGS: EMERGING GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN LAW 82 (Nestor
Davidson &Nisha Mistry eds., 2017). For a discussion of other aspects of the G-20’s financial
architecture project, see, for example, BRUMMER, supra note 35; Sungjoon Cho & Claire R.
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promote soft international law as preferable to hard law for addressing problems in international regulation of financial institutions and financial mar56
kets despite—and possibly because of—the fact that it is not enforceable.
That little international commercial law satisfies the test for legalization
set out by Abbott and Snidal is hardly surprising. Domestic private laws,
like many governing commercial transactions, are implemented and enforced differently than their domestic public law counterparts. While public
laws set mandatory obligations, private laws may condition obligation on
voluntary agreement of one sort or another. While mandatory public laws
are mostly enforced by states, private laws are often self-enforcing, albeit
with the assistance of state-sponsored courts.
None of this should be understood as an argument to disregard Abbott
and Snidal and their focus on precisely stated, independently enforceable
obligations when assessing international commercial law. But emphasizing
and examining the distinctions between hard and soft international commercial laws assist in understanding that the role of open-ended, non-binding
texts may hold distinct implications for commercial contexts, and particularly for the business actors to which they apply. These distinctions hold sovereignty and autonomy implications for the participants in national and
transnational commercial lawmaking and for the implementation and enforcement of these laws once promulgated, as more fully discussed in the
next two parts.

II. A Typology of Domestic Law Governing
Commercial Conduct
There are three distinct “models” of national laws governing the com57
mercial conduct of private parties. To keep them separate, I will refer to
one as commercial regulation, another as commercial common law, and the
third as a commercial code.

Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G-20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 491 (2012); Martin Gelter & Zehra G. Kavame Eroglu, Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics of Resistance Against IFRS, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 89, 102–03 (2014). So far, clubs of nations like the G-20 and G-7 have produced “leaders’ declarations,” which endorse “high level
principles” but nothing “harder.”
56.
See BRUMMER, supra note 35, ch. 3 (exploring why “most agreements, rules and
standards used for promulgation of international financial law [are] non-binding” but entered
into solemnly and complied with by means of reputation sanctions, market discipline, and institutional disciplines and how the “dominant explanations” of “soft law effectiveness” fall
short in explaining global financial markets).
57.
The reference here to national commercial laws is meant only to distinguish between national and transnational versions of these laws and not to discount the importance of
sub-national or local laws, such as state law in the United States. Moreover, while it may be
possible to apply a similar typology to any sort of private law, not just that governing commercial conduct of private parties, I leave questions of the generalizability of this analysis for
another time.
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With commercial regulation, a government establishes obligations or
restrictions on the commercial behavior of private actors through legislation.
Commercial regulation involves mandates. It is mandatory because governments often direct regulation at conduct they look to change (either by
58
limiting or prohibiting it). These mandates constrain private parties’ freedom to contract. Because regulation looks to alter behavior, strong governmental enforcement may be viewed as a necessary component to the regulatory scheme. Regulatory obligations are subject to enforcement (i) by
59
government action, (ii) by private action through government institutions,
60
such as government-sponsored courts, or (iii) through some combination
of private and public action. Banking laws and regulations, for example, are
61
enforced solely through public action; insolvency and intellectual property
62
laws set mandatory rules but are enforced mostly through private action;
the Sherman Antitrust Act and False Claims Act authorize both government
and private enforcement of their mandates, although they especially incentivize qui tam and other private actions with the promise of treble damages
63
if private law suits are successful.
58.
There may be constitutional as well as purely political limitations on the breadth of
conduct that the government can regulate.
59.
Government enforcement varies in terms of the extent to which government actors
possess and exercise jurisdiction to determine private actors’ compliance with the mandates
contained in regulation: more than simply require or prohibit conduct, regulation may specify
how a regulated entity should comply with regulatory requirements. For example, governments may enforce regulatory mandates with threat of criminal or civil action, such as with
securities regulations. They may assert visitorial jurisdiction that claims complete access to
the books and records of regulated entities, such as with bank regulations.
60.
For a discussion of regulation enforced through private action, see, for example,
Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637 (2013); J.
Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
61.
For a discussion of regulation enforced through a combination of public and private
enforcement, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private
Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285 (2016); Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies of Public UDAP
Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37 (2018); Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer
Protection: State and Private Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81
ANTITRUST L.J. 911 (2017); see also Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1077 (2018).
62.
Bankruptcy and insolvency laws often either require or allow for the appointment
of a trustee in bankruptcy (“TIB”). The TIB should be viewed as a quasi-public official and
litigation brought by the trustee as a hybrid between public/private action. Melissa B. Jacoby,
Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715 (2018). Intellectual property (“IP”)
laws usually either require or allow private parties to register these property interests in government sponsored registries. But ex post violations of IP laws are enforced (mostly) through
private causes of action brought before government-sponsored courts, unless criminal violations of the law are asserted. John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 (2013).
63.
See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107
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Government involvement with commercial common law is more attenuated and indirect than with commercial regulation. With commercial common law, private parties are mostly free to contract about their commercial
interactions. Breach of these privately established obligations is subject to
enforcement through (but not by) government institutions. Governmentsponsored courts may be engaged in dispute resolution through their supervision of litigation (with the court’s rationale in deciding a dispute recorded
in publicly available decisions that can guide the future action of private
parties) or by enforcing awards entered in privately conducted arbitration
proceedings (although the decisions of an arbitrator are often not made publicly available and so are less likely to guide future conduct). In either case,
however, these enforcement actions are initiated by private actors at private
expense. Unlike regulation, which may trigger a wide range of public enforcement action by government actors—whether government regulators,
investigators, or prosecutors—common law violations are self-enforcing
through private action or not at all. I refer to this as commercial common
law because, in common law countries, the decisions issued by courts to resolve private parties’ disputes are, or at least act as, law. Arbitral decisions
and privately negotiated contracts and other texts may similarly provide order for public parties, although these texts are not issued by governmental
actors and may not be publicly available for review or guidance.
Commercial codes offer a third alternative. Commercial conduct is governed by a commercial or other code in civil law jurisdictions, but the term
is used broadly here to also include statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all fifty of the United States. As with commercial
common law, private parties are mostly free to identify their own restrictions and set their own obligations in some private document, such as a
contract, and states offer courts as a means for dispute resolution, whether
directly through litigation or indirectly through enforcement of arbitral
awards. Distinct from common law development, courts resolve contract
disputes governed by commercial codes by following the logic set out in the
code rather than that set out in earlier judicial decisions. Courts’ reasoning
may be made publicly available, but, depending on the jurisdiction, these
published judicial decisions may have limited precedential effect; private
parties may not be able to rely on these judicial decisions to guide their conduct and contracting. Instead, governments draft commercial legislation in
codes to guide private parties in contracting and conducting their commercial affairs.

N.W. U. L. REV. 1689 (2013); David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225 (2013) (assessing
public and private enforcement of FCA); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative
Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws,
2011 BYU L. REV. 315 (2011) (discussing the relative merits of public and private enforcement of antitrust laws); D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in
Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (2012).
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Commercial codes may resemble regulation (as defined above) in that
both are creatures of legislation. Nonetheless, unlike regulation, a code generally does not seek to alter private conduct. Instead, codes often aim merely
to record conduct and custom and set out their findings in law-like form for
64
all to access. Neither commercial codes nor commercial common laws involve mandates in the same way that regulation does. Private parties are
governed by codes or common laws because they opt in to this law through
voluntary agreement and, depending on how these agreements are drafted,
may opt out of default provisions in the law. In this way, it is often said that
common law courts and codes both “find” rather than “make” law.

Figure 1: Varieties of Commercial Laws, and Their Implications
for Sovereignty and Private Party Autonomy
Commercial
Common
Law

x
x

x
Commercial
Code

x
x

x
Commercial
Regulation

x

x

x

Domestic Law
Private parties (PPs) set obligations, e.g., through contract
Private obligations self-enforced by PPs, through government-sponsored,
domestic courts
o
Litigation Æ entry of judgment + enforcement of judgment; OR
o
Enforcement of arbitral award
“Common law” created by judicial decision published ex post; courts
“find” law by examining past practices and past precedent
State, through legislature, sets out PPs’ obligations in a code
o
Legislatures “find” law through examining past practices
Private obligations self-enforced by PPs, through assistance of govtsponsored, domestic courts
o
Litigation Æ entry of judgment + enforcement of judgment; OR
o
Enforcement of arbitral award
Code exists ex ante; PPs trigger these obligations through private
arrangement, e.g., contract
o
PPs may opt out of code provisions through contract
State, through legislature, sets out PPs’ obligations in regulation
o
Regulations often set mandatory rules (no opt-out)
o
Legislatures “make” regulatory law
State, through executive, may implement and enforce regulation
o
Compliance
o
Public litigation Æ entry of judgment + enforcement of judgment;
OR
o
Enforcement of arbitral award (if arbitral)
State may delegate some or all enforcement authority to PPs
o
Private litigation Æ entry of judgment + enforcement of judgment;
OR
o
Enforcement of arbitral award (if arbitral)

64.
In this way, commercial codes are often referred to as a “modern” lex mercatoria.
See, e.g., Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
369 (2014); CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, The Unification of the Law of International Trade
(1968), in SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 206 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1988).
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Figure 1 summarizes this typology. It shows that government involvement in commercial common law is minimal, while government involvement in commercial regulation is substantial; government involvement in
commercial codes sits between these two. States rely on courts simultaneously to enforce and create commercial common law. With commercial
codes, states rely on legislatures to draft the codes and courts to enforce
them. With regulation, states rely on legislatures to draft, executive agents
to implement, and courts to enforce the regulations.
Figure 1 also informs understanding of businesses’ influence on commercial law and legal ordering in a domestic context. Influence is generally
described as the pressure that businesses exert on legislatures, regulators,
and state executives. Where a commercial code or regulation exists or has
been proposed at the national level, businesses may seek to affect the presence and content of the legislation and its enforcement through lobbying efforts. Lobbying is far less important with commercial common law, however, since, by definition, no legislation governs this law. The common law
nonetheless presents alternative avenues for influencing its direction and the
legal ordering of commerce. Here, businesses primarily assert their interests
through privately organized contracts and litigation brought to enforce these
contracts. If they are generally dissatisfied with the court system, they may
also exert political pressure for reform of the rules governing procedure or
judicial administration and possibly even of judges or juridical institutions.
If dissatisfied with the substance of specific judicial rulings in a particular
issue area, businesses may even push for legislation to overwrite the case
law.
In sum, this Part distinguished between three types of domestic commercial law—commercial common laws, commercial codes, and commercial regulation—to clarify that, considered as a whole, commercial law involves both private and public interests. Part III, next, complicates this
analysis to consider international commercial law. Unlike conventional international law analysis, which focuses on legal texts negotiated between
states to regulate the (public) obligations sovereign states owe to each other,
analysis of international commercial law requires consideration of both public and private obligations—that is, sovereign states’ obligations owed as a
result of an international treaty and the implications that states’ obligations
hold for commercial actors’ obligations to each other, including their contracts and litigation choices.

III. International Implications: Distinguishing Sovereignty
and Autonomy Effects of International Commercial Laws
How do state and business interests interact in the production of international commercial law? Under what circumstances are states’ sovereignty
interests and business’ autonomy interests consistent, and when do they diverge? How does this interaction of interests affect businesses that look to
influence international commercial lawmaking, not just through domestic
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channels but also in an international setting? And how has this interaction
affected the choice between hard and soft law governing international commercial markets? Each of these questions is analyzed below.
As noted in Part II, there are three distinct “models” of national laws
governing the commercial conduct of private parties: commercial common
law, commercial codes, and commercial regulation. The same sovereignty
and autonomy interests identified through this typology of domestic commercial laws assist in differentiating among the broad array of international
commercial laws—some procedural, some substantive; some that are nearly
hard, much that is very soft. The sections below first generally describe the
sovereignty and autonomy interests involved in the making of international
commercial laws. Sovereignty and autonomy interests vary with the type of
commercial law involved, but there may be more issue-specific national and
market interests at stake. Together these interests are applied to the list of
international commercial laws set out in Part I.

A. International Commercial Law and Its Implications for
Sovereignty and Autonomy
Part I identified two broad types of international commercial law treaties: procedural and substantive. Since the latter decades of the nineteenth
century, jurists have viewed multilateral conventions on matters of procedure to be the most promising avenue for international agreement governing
commercial transactions on the grounds that they were “apolitical,” or at
65
least removed from the politics of substance. Consistent with this expectation, more than several procedural treaties have entered into force, including
66
the New York Convention on the enforcement of arbitral awards. Like
domestic commercial common laws, procedural treaties minimally affect
states’ sovereignty interests. They bind domestic courts in specified ways
but may not otherwise constrain states. Procedural treaties also lightly touch
private, commercial parties’ autonomy interests. They limit some litigation
practices but strengthen others by enabling the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments; the substance of commercial rights and obligations is
otherwise untouched by procedural treaties.
The existence of hard, or mostly-hard, procedural international law is,
thus, explained to a large extent by an analysis of its limited intrusions on
the sovereignty interests of states and the autonomy interests of private,

65.
See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge from Europeanization and Globalization, in AKTUELLE
FRAGEN ZU POLITISCHER UND RECHTLICHER STEUERUNG IM KONTEXT DER
GLOBALISIERUNG 119, 124 n.21 (Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2007),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2812 (describing the “private international law” analysis of Story and Savigny as intentionally “apolitical,”); Daniela Caruso, Private Law And State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 20
(2007) (same).
66.
See New York Convention, supra note 40.
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commercial actors. Treaties governing the enforcement of awards or judgments and other procedural matters encroach only, or at least mostly, on the
judicial authority within a nation state. As a result, they intrude less on the
sovereignty of ratifying countries than treaties governing substantive areas
of law. Treaties on the recognition and enforcement of judgments also impinge lightly on the autonomy of the commercial actors located in these
countries, especially where the treaty enforces choice of court and choice of
law provisions in parties’ contracts. International laws governing the enforceability of international arbitral awards are even less intrusive on sovereignty and autonomy interests given that treaties on arbitral enforcement are
limited to a single, procedural issue and that the private parties whose disputes are governed by such treaties contractually agreed to arbitrate in the
first place. Both sorts of international procedural laws mirror the logic of
domestic commercial common law in that both sorts of commercial laws
focus on the enforcement of the contracts between private, commercial actors.
And yet, broad agreement on a multilateral convention governing the
recognition and enforcement of judgments has evaded international agreement, despite international consensus on the enforceability of arbitral
awards. There is also a substantial body of soft international law on the procedures to be followed in litigating commercial claims before domestic
courts and in international arbitration proceedings. The details of this hard
and soft international law are discussed below with an eye to explaining the
relative absence of hard law on the recognition of foreign judgments and
presence of soft international laws on topics of commercial procedure.
There are also several treaties on topics of commercial law that extend
beyond procedure and reach to substance. Two of these substantive commercial treaties govern topics that, under national law, would count as
common law or a commercial code because they govern contracts of one
67
form or another. Another of these treaties is both regulatory and “codelike” in that private parties must first opt in to the contracts governing these
68
international interests before its mandatory rules apply.
Once parties opt in to these international laws through contract, each of
these substantive treaties constrains commercial actors’ freedom to contract
in specified ways, but these constraints are, in turn, limited. Only the international commercial transaction specified in the convention is implicated;
purely domestic transactions continue to be governed by the relevant do67.
These include contracts for the international sale of goods in the case of the CISG
and contracts for the carriage of goods by sea in the case of the Hague-Visby Rules. Hague
Rules, supra note 42; CISG, supra note 43.
68.
Cape Town Convention, supra note 44. The Cape Town Convention is also at least
“conditionally regulatory” in that the international interests it governs are valid and effective
against non-parties to the contract on the basis of satisfying the registration requirements set
out in the treaty and one of the appended protocols. See, e.g., Roy Goode, Private Commercial
Law Conventions and Public and Private International Law: The Radical Approach of the
Cape Town Convention 2001 and Its Protocols, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 523 (2016).
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mestic law. In addition, contracting parties may opt out of one of these conventions—the CISG—through the simple expedient of choosing some other
69
applicable law.
Because these substantive treaties are triggered by, and potentially limited by, private contracts, most of the obligations under them are borne by
private parties. States’ obligations under these substantive commercial law
treaties are relatively limited: Domestic courts are obligated not to enter
judgments inconsistent with the rules set out in the treaty once it is satisfied
the treaty governs the transaction. Further, domestic legislatures are obligated not to produce laws inconsistent with the treaty provisions. Like other
types of contracts, the contracts subject to these substantive commercial law
treaties are self-enforcing.
The typology spelled out in Part II, above, assists in understanding why
global lawmakers succeeded in promulgating these nearly-hard, code-like
conventions, but—as with the explanation of international lawmaking on
procedural matters—does not tell the full story. There is also a growing
body of soft international law governing international contracts, including
international contracts for the sale of goods, which gets detailed below. The
purpose of this supplementary soft law on international contracts is similar
to the soft international law on topics of commercial arbitration and concili70
ation—one complements the other by providing a gap-filling function.
Finally, international commercial law implicating national commercial
regulation would create maximal imposition on state sovereignty. This is
because a “regulatory” treaty would constrain three distinct aspects of sovereignty: a state’s judiciary would be obligated to decide enforcement actions brought before it, whether by public or private parties, consistent with
the rules set out in the treaty; its legislature could not enact legislation inconsistent with the treaty provisions; and its executive would be required to
enforce treaty obligations in the same way as with obligations under domestic commercial regulation.
Not surprisingly, the only international commercial legislation that approaches a regulatory topic is insolvency law and possibly intellectual property law, depending upon the breadth of the definition of commercial law. If
we expand the circle slightly to include both international commercial and
financial laws and open up the possibility for consideration of regulations
governing securities, capital markets, and financial institutions, we find additional international texts—but few if any international or multilateral conventions. On these topics, global lawmakers have produced hard interna-

69.
CISG, supra note 43, art. 6.
70.
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 51–53 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004) (analyzing
three “pathways to cooperation” through the interaction of hard and soft international law);
Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 722–27, 733 (analyzing the range of IL and IR scholarship
that views hard and soft international law as “complements”).
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tional law only on the regulation of intellectual property with the TRIPS
71
72
convention. International insolvency law and the international law governing banking, securities, and other financial regulatory topics are all for73
mulated as soft law.
The lack of hard, or nearly-hard, international legislation on these regulatory topics is, thus, mostly explained by the breadth of the intrusions on
the sovereignty of any country bound to such a mandate. Hard international
law governing banking regulation or the regulation of capital markets would
tread on all three “sovereign toes” in that domestic versions of these types
of laws involve national legislation enforced by national regulators or other
executives through national courts. Hard international law governing intellectual property or insolvency laws would not tread on national executives’
interests in regulatory enforcement to the same extent since these laws are
mostly self-enforced by the private parties, but it would tread, in some way,
on all three branches of national government. In addition, depending on how
they are drafted, international commercial laws implicating national commercial regulations may constrain private parties’ freedom to contract, although these autonomous interests may already be severely limited by the
governing domestic regulation. Moreover, because commercial regulation
mostly sets mandates, private parties may not be able to opt out—regardless
of whether such regulations impose international or national obligations.
A focus on the sovereignty and autonomy interests at risk with international commercial regulation may explain the absence of hard international
laws on these regulated issue areas, but what explains the presence of soft
international laws in substantive areas on which domestic regulation is
commonplace, such as insolvency law or the regulation of financial institutions and financial and capital markets? Existing commentary posits com74
plementary or antagonistic roles for soft laws layered with hard laws, but
these analyses do not explain stand-alone soft laws that neither bolster nor
compete with pre-existing hard international law. This earlier commentary
also focuses nearly exclusively on states’ interests, but our focus on international commercial law forces consideration of the interests of sub-national
actors (such as regulators) and non-state actors (such as the businesses and
transactions to which the soft law texts are directed). Puzzles remain regard-

71.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
72.
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10
(2005); UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART THREE: TREATMENT
OF ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN INSOLVENCY, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2012); UNCITRAL
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART FOUR: DIRECTORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN THE
PERIOD APPROACHING INSOLVENCY, U.N. Sales No. E.13.V.10 (2013).
73.
See, e.g., supra note 55 (discussing the predominance of soft international law in
this context).
74.
See, e.g., Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 722–27, 788–98.
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ing the extent of reliance on soft international law in these commercial contexts and the possible influence of business actors in this decisionmaking.

B. Digging into the Details
The next sections dig more deeply into the details of international
commercial lawmaking, both in terms of business access to international
arenas of lawmaking and to the implications of such access for the choice
between hard and soft international commercial law. They first discuss international commercial laws governing procedural topics (enforcement of
arbitration awards; enforcement of judgments; enforcement of choice of
court and choice of law clauses) and then proceed to substantive commercial code treaties (international sale of goods; international transport; international interests in moveable equipment) and international commercial
regulation (insolvency and financial markets).

1. Arbitration and Dispute Resolution
The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards was first signed in 1958, quickly entered into effect in
75
1959, and currently enjoys ratification by an impressive 159 countries. The
76
scope of the New York Convention is fairly limited. It governs only the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. It does not govern
77
the conduct of arbitration proceedings, nor does it reach the recognition or
enforcement of settlements arising out of other dispute mechanisms, such as
78
conciliation or mediation. Although the New York Convention is not ex75.
New York Convention, supra note 40. For a list of the countries acceding to the
terms of the New York Convention, see Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en (last visited Mar. 20, 2019).
76.
Although there are about 15 articles in the convention, the bulk of its mandates are
found in article III. It provides that “each Contracting State shall recognize [transnational or
international] arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, . . . .” New York Convention, supra
note 40, art. III; see also id. art. I (defining the scope of the treaty as applying to “arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought,”); id. art. V (specifying several exceptions to such
recognition and enforcement).
77.
See New York Convention, supra note 40, art. V, ¶ 1(a)–(e). But see UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/
en/texts/arbitration/contractualtexts/arbitration (last visited Mar. 24, 2019); UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with Amendments Adopted (2006),
U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/
commercial_arbitration (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
78.
But see United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, to be opened for signature Aug. 7, 2019, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex I;
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980), U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L.,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/contractualtexts/conciliation (last visited Mar. 24,
2019); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Set-
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pressly limited to the recognition of commercial arbitration awards, its primary purpose is historically viewed as the promotion of international trade
79
and commercial transactions.
The 159 countries that are bound by the New York Convention, thus,
have agreed to relatively small limitations on their sovereignty. Although
the Convention refers to the obligations of “each Contracting State,” these
obligations are centered on the courts of the Contracting States. The Convention imposes strong obligations on domestic courts to enforce and recognize transnational or international arbitral awards within its scope. But it
does not limit domestic courts’ enforcement of domestic arbitral awards; nor
does it limit the authority of domestic legislatures or other rulemaking bodies with jurisdiction over the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. As
such, the New York Convention steps on only one “toe” of a state’s sovereignty.
This limited encroachment on sovereignty accounts both for the willingness of so many states to accede to the international obligations set out in
the Convention and for its biggest weakness. Criticism of the New York
Convention mostly centers on complaints about national courts in countries
bound to the New York Convention that purport to follow the convention
but decline to enforce an arbitral award on grounds viewed as indefensible,
mostly overbroad interpretations of the “public policy” exception to en80
forcement found in the Convention. Since there is no international court
with jurisdiction to review the “erroneous” decisions of “rogue” national
courts, there is little that can be done about national courts’ overly broad
81
readings of the Convention’s exceptions. This slippage is precisely the
concern raised by Abbott and Snidal—unless international legislation is enforceable by an international court or dispute mechanism, its “obligations”
may be undermined by national actors and enabled by national courts.
tlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L.,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_conciliation (last visited
Mar. 24, 2019).
79.
See, e.g., Allen Sultan, The United Nations Arbitration Convention and United
States Policy, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 807, 824 (1959) (reviewing the history of the preparation of
the New York Convention and arguing that the United States should ratify it on the grounds
that “the goals of international commercial arbitration do not vary from the general objectives
of society—prosperity, security, human freedom, and justice.”).
80.
See, e.g., Leon Trakman, Domestic Courts Declining to Recognize and Enforce
Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Comparative Reflection, 6 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 174 (2018) (describing court decisions from the United States, China, and the Netherlands discussing the
breadth of the “public policy exception” in the New York Convention).
81.
Soft law provides some measure of redress, although an obviously unenforceable
one. For an example of this sort of effort at moral suasion, see Recommendation Regarding
the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, of the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Done in New York, 10 June
1958 (2006), U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/
arbitration/explanatorytexts/recommendations/foreign_arbitral_awards (last visited Mar. 24,
2019) [hereinafter Recommendation].
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82

UNCITRAL has long supplemented its hard international law on the
enforcement of commercial arbitral awards with soft law. Since as early as
1976, UNCITRAL promulgated a number of soft laws on the topic of commercial arbitration and conciliation: there are rules on arbitration, concilia83
tion, and investor-state arbitration, model laws on both commercial arbitra84
tion and commercial conciliation, and further “explanatory texts,” such as
85
texts it refers to as a Secretariat Guide, Notes, and Recommendations.
What can soft law accomplish in this context, when hard international
laws have failed to button down the details of arbitration and conciliation?
To a large extent, this soft law is directed to businesses’ influence in implementing the New York Convention. As noted above, the Convention is
mostly silent on how foreign arbitration proceedings should be conducted,
but the soft rules and model laws subsequently promulgated by UNCITRAL
fill in these gaps. UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules are explicitly directed at
private parties, and they set out best practices associated with the conduct of

82.
Recently, UNCITRAL expanded the scope of its multilateral conventions to include
a broader range of dispute resolution. It has “hardened” its soft law on conciliation/mediation
and produced a draft treaty on aspects of this topic. See United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, supra note 78. It has also begun to
extend the reach of its arbitration treaties beyond commercial arbitration to include investorstate arbitration. See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based InvestorState Arbitration, Dec. 10, 2014, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/transparencyconvention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf. The Mauritius Convention has been signed by 22
countries; although so far only 5 countries have fully ratified this convention, it has entered
into effect. 3. United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
IND&mtdsg_no=XXII-3&chapter=22 (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). Investor-state arbitration is
distinct from commercial arbitration in that the latter involves the effectuation of a purely private agreement to arbitrate, while the former concerns arbitration between a private investor
and a public actor, whether the state itself or some state-sponsored entity. For a discussion of
UNCITRAL’s work on investor-state arbitration, see, for example, Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410
(2018); Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the
Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361 (2018). Because investor-state arbitration
involves arbitration between both public and private parties, I leave discussion of this debate
for another day.
83.
See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Arbitration, supra note 82; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 77; UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980), supra note 78.
84.
See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
Amendments Adopted (2006), supra note 77; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (2018),
supra note 78.
85.
See, e.g., Recommendations to Assist Arbitral Institutions and Other Interested
Bodies with Regard to Arbitrations Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), U.N.
COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/explanatorytexts/
recommendations/arbitration_rules_interested_bodies (last visited Mar. 24, 2019); Recommendation, supra note 81.
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86

foreign arbitration and conciliation proceedings. Its Model Law on Commercial Arbitration is directed at domestic legislatures and fulfills a similar
87
gap-filling function.
Supplementary or “gap-filling” soft law is more than non-binding international texts that pick up where the language of a related convention left
off. Soft law on commercial arbitration, although non-binding, can influence
private parties’ behaviors in multiple, specific ways. Parties, aware of the
standards set out in the UNCITRAL rules, can specify in their arbitration or
conciliation agreements that proceedings should comply with those standards set out in the rules. These parties can refer to UNCITRAL’s Arbitration
Rules when seeking judicial recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award. They can seek enforcement in jurisdictions where the national courts
have in the past looked to such rules for guidance. Moreover, parties can
commit, contractually, to situate eventual arbitration proceedings in states
that have enacted legislation to implement UNCITRAL’s Model Law on
Commercial Arbitration. They can also decide against choosing to arbitrate
in a jurisdiction that has declined to enact legislation to implement this
88
model law.
Soft laws on arbitration procedures are directed toward this private be89
havior, often explicitly. The role of business actors and other private parties in influencing the conduct of international arbitration proceedings involves the practices followed in arbitrations and in the contractual
90
provisions that govern these practices. In the absence of soft law on the
topic, these arbitration practices would be uncoordinated and, thus, less
concentrated an influence. UNCITRAL’s soft laws signal both to litigants in
private arbitrations and to the international arbitrators to which these litigants direct their argument how to conduct proceedings to maximize en91
forcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention.
Given the focus and effect of this soft law on the conduct of private action, the involvement of private, commercial actors in the preparation of
these soft law texts might be viewed as both to be expected and consistent
with the legitimacy of the resulting soft law text. Private actors’ involvement in the drafting of UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules is evident on the
86.
In its website, UNCITRAL describes the Arbitration Rules as a “comprehensive set
of procedural rules” that “cover all aspects of the arbitral process, providing a model arbitration clause, setting out procedural rules regarding the appointment of arbitrators and the conduct of arbitral proceedings, and establishing rules in relation to the form, effect and interpretation of the award.” UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 77.
87.
As a model law, and so directed toward domestic legislatures, UNCITRAL’s Model
Law on Commercial Arbitration also fulfills an advocacy function.
88.
Thanks are owed to Susan Franck for this point.
89.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 77, art. 1(1).
90.
For an argument that these practices themselves constitute a sort of soft law, see
Alvarez, supra note 36.
91.
Cf. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 18, at 118 (referring to coordinating effects of
soft law but viewing this coordination as between states rather than as between private actors).
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92

face of this text, and in their attendance at the annual meeting of
93
UNCITRAL’s governing commission to ratify the Rules. While the Rules
are directed predominantly at the conduct of private parties, UNCITRAL’s
Model Law on Commercial Arbitration is instead directed to domestic legislatures. State delegations were more involved in the drafting of the Model
Law than the Rules, but businesses’ involvement was strong in both contexts. The working group charged with drafting UNCITRAL’s Model Law
on Commercial Arbitration included observers from international associations involved directly and indirectly with the conduct of such proceed94
ings.

2. Recognition and Enforcement of
Other Types of Awards or Judgments
If hard, or mostly-hard, international law on the enforcement of arbitral
awards has commanded the agreement of so many countries, what about the
enforcement of judgments entered by domestic courts when involved in
transnational litigation? International laws on this topic should also be relatively easy to garner acceptance since they should involve a similarly limited encroachment on national sovereignty.
International and transnational organizations and similar actors have
viewed international procedural agreements as low-hanging fruit since the
late nineteenth century, when the first session of the Hague Conference on
95
Private International Law was convened. Optimism about the likelihood of
reaching international consensus on topics of procedure has been mostly
96
overblown. The Hague Conference has long promulgated conventions on

92.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules for
Optional Use in Ad Hoc Arbitration Relating to International Trade (UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/112 (1975), reprinted in [1976] 7 Y.B. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE
L. 157, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976 (describing the process through which the Arbitration
Rules were produced and referring to a handful of expert academics who worked without the
assistance of member state delegations or a working group).
93.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on Its Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976),
reprinted in [1976] 7 Y.B. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L. 157, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976
(included among the NGOs that attended the Commission’s annual meeting in 1976: InterAmerican Commercial Arbitration Commission; International Chamber of Commerce; International Council for Commercial Arbitration; International Law Association).
94.
See, e.g., Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group on Arbitration and
Conciliation on its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/614 (2006) (included among the
NGOs listed as attending its working group session: “Forum for International Commercial
Arbitration (FICA), International Arbitration Institute (IAI), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA)”).
95.
See, e.g., HAROLD C. GUTTERIDGE, THE CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1951) (discussing the pros and cons of PIL conventions versus codification efforts aimed at unifying private laws).
96.
See HAROLD C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF THE STUDY OF LAW 41–60 (1946) (noting that international
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various aspects of international procedural law. International convergence
mostly focuses on recognition of procedural aspects of litigation to protect
the interests of children, as well as general procedural issues such as docu97
ment recognition, evidence, and service of process. The Hague Conference
has also promulgated a convention on recognition of choice of court provi98
sions in commercial agreements. It has not succeeded more generally,
however, in finalizing a convention on the recognition and enforcement of
99
judgments.
Transnational and regional agreements on the recognition and enforcement of judgments have been far more successful than broad international
agreements. Nearly every country in Europe is bound in some way to either
100
the Brussels and Rome Conventions or to the more recent EU Directives
101
on these topics. These transnational agreements mostly center on judgagreement on procedural topics of “private international law” has not been reached because
these subjects are not as apolitical as some had thought).
97.
See, e.g., Conventions, Protocols and Principles, supra note 41 (listing the conventions and other international instruments promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law). The Hague Conference also acts as the depository of record for these conventions in order to keep track of their entry into force and the countries bound to them. For a
copy of “a full status report . . . showing the dates of signatures, ratifications, accessions and
entry into force; the texts of declarations and reservations; the territorial units to which the
Convention has been extended; the acceptances of accessions; the authorities designated,” see
Status Chart, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/statuscharts (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
98.
See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294.
Although this choice of court treaty has entered into effect, only 32 countries are bound to its
terms. See Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HAGUE CONF. ON
PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2019). This number is far fewer than those party to the New York Convention,
but the Choice of Court Convention is far younger than the New York Convention. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 75 (159 parties to the New York Convention).
99.
This is not for lack of trying. The Hague Conference has worked on its “Judgments
Project” since at least 1992. See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L.,
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
100.
Recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases was originally governed within the European Economic Community by the 1968 Brussels Convention.
See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sep. 27, 1968, https://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/ctextes/brux-idx.htm (EC). The Brussels Convention has been replaced by the Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2007 O.J.
(L 339) 1. The Brussels Convention is often discussed in conjunction with the 1980 Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 2. See generally CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION IN EUROPE (Paul Beaumont et al. eds., 2017) (providing an
extensive analysis of the Brussels and Rome Conventions).
101.
Both the Brussels and Rome Conventions have been superseded within the EU by a
series of regulations. See Council Regulation (EU) No. 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000, O.J. (L 12) 1
(the first Brussels regulation) [hereinafter Brussels I]; Council Regulation (EC) No.
1215/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012, O.J. (L 351) 1 (the recast Brussels regulation, repealing Brussels
I) [hereinafter Brussels II]; Council Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008, O.J. (L
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ments entered in commercial and civil proceedings rather than other types
102
of proceedings. Broad exceptions are carved out from these European
103
agreements (for example, insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings are not
104
covered by the Brussels Regime ), although other European directives
were later adopted to fill in some of these gaps (for example, the EU Di105
rective on Cross-Border Insolvency).
Regional agreement on the recognition and enforcement of judgments
have succeeded where broader international agreement has not, partly because these regional agreements are—to state the obvious—more limited in
geographical scope. Countries are simply more willing to enter into commitments to enforce foreign judgments when they understand more about
the courts whose judgments they are committing to recognize and enforce.
Comprehension of the consequences of an international agreement on matters of procedure can be clarified and contained where commitments of
recognition and enforcement are coupled with agreements on which country’s courts will have jurisdiction over a particular matter and which coun106
try’s law will govern the dispute brought before such a court. However,
these sorts of “triple” private international law (“PIL”) treaties are hard to
achieve on an international, rather than simply a regional, basis. They involve three times as many topics to comprehend before agreeing to sign on
and three times as many encroachments to the sovereignty of the signing
107
countries. These “triple” PIL treaties govern not only (i) the receiving
court’s obligation to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, but also (ii)
the jurisdictional reach of the court that entered that judgment and (iii) the

177) 6 (the first Rome regulation concerning the law applicable to contractual obligations)
[hereinafter Rome I]; see also Council Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007, O.J. (L
199) 40 (regulation applicable to non-contractual obligations, related to Rome I, and often
referred to as Rome II).
102.
See Brussels I, supra note 101, at pmbl., ¶ 7 (noting that it broadly reaches “all the
main civil and commercial matters apart from certain well-defined matters”); Brussels II, supra note 101, at pmbl., ¶ 5.
103.
Brussels I, supra note 101, art. 1, ¶ 1; Brussels II, supra note 101, art. 1, ¶ 1.
104.
Brussels I, supra note 101, art. 1, ¶ 2(b); Brussels II, supra note 101, art. 1, ¶ 2(b)
(both identically stating that the Regulation does not apply to “bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements,
compositions and analogous proceedings”).
105.
See Susan Block-Lieb, Reaching to Restructure Across Borders (Without OverReaching), Even After Brexit, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 18–23 (2018) (discussing the EU Directive on Cross-Border Insolvency, both as initially drafted and as more recently recast, and
its interaction with the Brussels and Rome Regulations).
106.
For a discussion of shifts in emphasis among the traditional focus on jurisdiction,
choice of law, and enforcement, see James Fawcett, The Interrelationships of Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law in Private International Law, 44 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 39 (1991).
107.
For a discussion of the Hague Conference’s most recent work on enforcement of
judgments, see id.
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law applicable in the decisionmaking preceding entry of that judgment.
Bundling together international agreement on questions of jurisdiction and
governing law make international obligations of recognition and enforcement more predictable and thus more palatable, but are harder to achieve.
European directives on enforcement and recognition of judgments are
just this type of “triple” PIL: they tie transnational agreement on the recognition of judgment to commitments on jurisdiction and applicable law governing this litigation, as well as agreements to be bound to decisions of the
Court of Justice of the European Union to construe these regional commit109
ments. The latter agreement ensures that European PIL treaties approach
hard international law as defined by Abbott and Snidal, although these treaties (or, later, directives) are only transnational and not international in
scope.
Draft conventions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments
drafted by the Hague Conference are also framed as “triple” PIL treaties.
However, states have been negotiating a version of the convention to require
recognition and enforcement of civil judgements in commercial litigation
for many years, without succeeding in finalizing any draft agreement. This
debate may come to a head at the June 2019 meeting of the Hague Confer110
ence. Moreover, unlike European law on PIL, there have been no proposals to submit disputes over subsequent treaty interpretation to an international court. As a result, any international convention on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments, whether put forward by the Hague Conference
or not, would be subject to the same limitations as the New York Convention: it would be subject to the vagaries of national courts receiving requests
111
for such enforcement.
Recently, this log jam may have begun to disassemble with tentative
steps toward soft laws on these topics. The Hague Conference on Private
International Law recently published its Principles on Choice of Law on In-

108.
See Ronald A. Brand, New Challenges in the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments, in THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS
CHALLENGES (Franco Ferrari & Diego P. Fernandez Arroyo eds., forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3246053 (“The private international law
system has its own three pillars: jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.”).
109.
Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2004 O.J. (C
310) 210. See Brand, supra note 108, at 15–24 (reviewing jurisdiction, applicable law, and
judgment recognition under European law).
110.
Brand, supra note 108, at 43–44 (referring to a Hague Conference draft Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments scheduled for a diplomatic conference in June 2019, detailing the jurisdictional and other problems in this draft, and concluding
that the negotiated result “is unlikely to work so well in a global convention subject to homeward trend interpretations in each Contracting State”).
111.
Id.

Spring 2019]

The Role of Business

461

112

ternational Commercial Contracts. UNCITRAL promulgated its Model
113
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“MLCBI”) in 1997, which loosely re114
sembles the EU Insolvency Directive and has been implemented by as
115
many as 46 countries, including the United States and United Kingdom.
Late in 2018, UNCITRAL also promulgated its Model Law on Recognition
116
and Enforcement of Insolvency Related Judgments (“MLREIRJ”). These
are certainly not hard international law as Abbott and Snidal would define
117
it. In addition, none of these soft laws cover the breadth that a triple PIL
treaty would have. The Choice of Law Principles would, if enacted as domestic legislation, govern questions of what law should govern a dispute but
say nothing about the jurisdictional reach of the court entering a judgment
or the commitment of some receiving court to recognize or enforce that
judgment. The Model Laws on insolvency proceedings and insolvency related judgments are silent on which country’s insolvency or other law
should govern and mostly silent about questions of jurisdictional reach but
nonetheless purport obligations of recognition and enforcement.
Why have international lawmakers turned to soft law in this context,
and why have they set their sights so narrowly? What, if any, is the role of
business in this turn toward soft law? In analyzing hard and soft international laws on the enforcement of arbitral awards, this Article emphasizes the
important effects that these soft laws might have on private parties’ decisions regarding the scope of their arbitration agreements, the conduct of an
arbitration proceeding, and their decisionmaking about where (that is, in
what state) to bring such a proceeding. In this context, soft laws on commercial arbitration supplemented the New York Convention—that is, the
hard international law on these topics.
112.
Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, Mar.
19, 2015, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135 [hereinafter
Hague Conference Choice of Law Principles].
113.
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997) [hereinafter MLCBI].
114.
For discussion of the resemblance and distinctions between MLCBI and EU Insolvency Directive, see, for example, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 570–74 (1996) .
115.
Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), U.N.
COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/crossborder_insolvency/status (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
116.
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INSOLVENCYRELATED JUDGMENTS (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 1997), https://uncitral.un.org/
sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/interim_mlij.pdf.
117.
For example, not only can a national legislature add non-uniform provisions to
these model laws when enacting legislation to implement them, both the MLCBI and
MLREIRJ depend on national courts for interpretation of their provisions. The Hague Conference Choice of Law Principles are similarly not enforceable obligations. Although entitled
“principles” rather than a “model law,” the Choice of Law Principles are framed in language
precise enough for domestic enactment, as is, and indeed official commentary to these Principles invites national legislatures to do just this.
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Soft laws like the Hague Conference Choice of Law Principles and
UNCITRAL’s insolvency model laws cannot be viewed as fulfilling a similar gap-filling purpose. None of these soft laws can be viewed as supplementary to a correlative international treaty. The purpose of these standalone soft laws is instead to convince domestic legislatures to enact national
laws identical to, or at least resembling, their provisions. They fulfill an
“advocacy” function by providing draft language that domestic legislatures
might enact and also spelling out the arguments in favor of such enactment.
In addition to advocacy of these public, sub-national entities, these standalone soft laws may also look to convince private, commercial parties to get
involved. Private parties can be guided by this soft law when lobbying states
to get serious about negotiating a triple PIL commercial treaty, to be sure.
But private, commercial actors can also contract and litigate in a way that
would encourage a broader range of countries to enact such legislation.
The public and private advocacy functions of these soft laws work together. Although ostensibly the exclusive purpose of the Choice of Law
Principles is to promote “party autonomy” regarding contractual choice of
118
law clauses, this soft law alone would not bind domestic courts’ considerations as to whether to enforce a contractual choice of law clause. As a result, the Hague Principles of Choice of Law may not prompt much contractual private action in the absence of domestic legislation committing to the
119
enforcement of such clauses. As a first move, the Principles look to convince national actors to press for such legislation; once that legislation is in
place, the Principles would serve as a guide to contracting parties, to litigants, and ultimately to the courts asked to enforce such clauses in the event
of a dispute.
A similar advocacy project is implicit with UNCITRAL’s insolvencyfocused model laws. Its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency looked
mostly to convince domestic legislatures to enact implementing legislation.
Unlike a commercial treaty, which would only enter into force if a specified
number of countries accede to its terms, a model law is enforceable with the
first country’s enactment. The success of the MLCBI and MLREIRJ also
depend on convincing private parties to contract and litigate in ways consistent with their terms. In other words, UNCITRAL is betting that its
MLCBI and MLREIRJ are “hard enough” to encourage private parties to
choose to bring insolvency-related litigation in jurisdictions that have enacted legislation to implement these model laws, but these subject matter areas
are narrow, so the learning will be slow.
Not surprisingly, businesses and other private actors were involved in
the drafting of these stand-alone soft laws. No empirical study of the Choice
118.
Hague Conference Choice of Law Principles, supra note 112, intro.; see also
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts:
Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 878 (2013).
119.
See Symeonides, supra note 118 (explaining that, in arbitration, both parties must
agree on where to arbitrate, but generally plaintiffs choose where to litigate).
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of Law Principles exists, but the fingerprints of business actors are relatively
clear—not surprisingly, considering the Principles focus exclusively on contractual provisions for choosing a country’s law and private parties have
every interest in enhancing the predictability of commercial agreements in
120
this way. Review of background papers publicly available on the Hague
Choice of Law Principles confirms that private actors enjoyed access to the
project as observers, although this right of observation cannot be equated
with influence on the project in the absence of further qualitative study.
121
Having a seat at the table is only a necessary first step to influence. A list
of the members of the working group charged with drafting the Hague
Choice of Law Principles includes nineteen members—sixteen of whom
were legal academics from around the world, in addition to two judges and
122
one practicing lawyer. This working group was also aided by six “observers,” four of whom came from international trade associations with interests
123
in the wide enforcement of choice of law clauses. Similarly, non-state actors’ involvement in the drafting of UNCITRAL’s MLCBI and MLREIRJ is
also clear. Since its inception, UNCITRAL has allowed non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) to observe its working group sessions, and NGOs
such as the International Bar Association, INSOL International, and the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) regularly attend these sessions
124
and, indeed, observations by NGOs have been constant since then.

3. Contracts Concerning Commercial Conduct, and the
International Laws Governing Such Contracts
Several longstanding and widely ratified treaties govern the substance
of commercial contracts. The Hague Rules and its related Visby Protocol
(1924 and 1968) have been ratified by more than one hundred countries and
are widely reported to represent more than ninety percent of the world’s

120.
For a discussion of the entities likely to rely on the Hague Conference Choice of
Law Principles, see Jürgen Basedow, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law: Their Addressees and Impact, 22 UNIFORM L. REV. 304 (2017).
121.
For an empirical study of attendance at UNCITRAL working group sessions premised similarly on the importance of attendance in influencing in international lawmaking, see
Terence C. Halliday, Josh Pacewicz, & Susan Block-Lieb, Who Governs? Delegations and
Delegates in Global Trade Lawmaking, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 279 passim (2013); BLOCKLIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 161–92.
122.
See List of Working Group Members and Observances, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV.
INT’L L., https://assets.hcch.net/docs/21d5893d-7f0d-4f4a-84cb-10d28ac643f2.pdf (last updated Mar. 8, 2010).
123.
Id. (listing two observers from the International Chamber of Commerce, one from
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association and another from the International Bar
Association).
124.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 50–91 (discussing the emergence of
UNCITRAL and observations by NGOs in first Commission sessions); id. at 161–92 (empirically assessing attendance by state and non-state delegations to UNCITRAL across three
working groups).
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125

trade volume. The UN’s Convention on the International Sale of Goods
126
(1980) has been ratified by 90 countries. The UNIDROIT Cape Town
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (2000) has been
ratified by 76 countries and the EU. The UNCITRAL Convention on the
Use of Electronic Communication in International Contracts has also entered into force but is less widely acceded to than these other conventions
(2005); it has been signed or ratified by 22 countries, but only nine countries
fully acceded to its terms.
Each of these conventions governs a specific kind of international
127
commercial contract. Except for the Cape Town Convention, domestic
versions of the contracts governed by these conventions are either governed
by commercial common law or civil codes on contract law generally. Moreover, the domestic laws that would otherwise govern the contracts now subject to the Cape Town Convention mostly resemble commercial codes, not
128
regulations. Additionally, all of these conventions (Hague-Visby Rules;
CISG; Cape Town Convention) pertain exclusively to transnational contracts of the kind identified in these international agreements: a shipper from
country A and carrier from country B (Hague-Visby Rules); a buyer from
country A and seller from country B (CISG); a secured creditor claiming an
international interest in aircraft collateral or other covered mobile equip-

125.
See the Hague Rules, supra note 42. For statistics on the status of this treaty and its
economic impact, see BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 100.
126.
See CISG, supra note 43.
127.
Secured transactions, including the commercial transactions creating international
interests in mobile equipment within the scope of the Cape Town Convention, are by and
large contractual arrangements between a borrower and lender. These secured transactions
laws are not purely contractual, however, in that they purport to bind the borrower’s other
creditors to the priority claimed by the lender claiming a right to security in such a contract.
Often, domestic laws enforce the priority claimed by the lender so long as the contract satisfies various conditions set out in such laws and notice of the security right is made public according to the requirements of such a law. For a more detailed discussion of the combination
of contractual and mandatory obligations implicit in secured transactions law, see
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2007), U.N. Sales No.
E.09.V.12 (2010).
128.
U.S. federal law—the Federal Aviation Act—governs transfers of any interest in
certain covered aircraft, including financing interests such as a financial lease, conditional
title, or other security rights. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 44107–44109 (2012). Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs other personal property collateral under U.S. law.
U.C.C. § 9-109 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Other codes based on article
9, like the Personal Property Security Acts adopted in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, or
codes enacted in civil law jurisdictions to govern security rights or contract law more generally similarly govern personal property collateral of various sorts. See, e.g., Anthony Duggan &
Michael Gedye, Personal Property Security Law Reform in Australia and New Zealand: The
Impetus for Change, 27 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 655, 656 (2009) (tracing the reform of Australian secured transactions laws as relates to earlier similar laws in New Zealand, Canada, and the
United States).
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ment and extending credit on the basis of this collateral to a borrower from
129
country B (Cape Town Convention).
As with international conventions on matters of procedure, some of this
hard international law has also been supplemented with soft international
law, although the combination of hard and soft international law is not uni130
form across all these subject matter areas. For example, UNCITRAL’s
Convention on the International Sales of Goods has been “supplemented”
131
by UNIDROIT’s Principles on International Commercial Contracts.
The previous sections demonstrate that soft international laws supplemented treaties on enforcement of litigation and arbitral awards for different
132
reasons. The New York Convention is surrounded by supplementary, gapfilling soft law that has become incrementally harder. The Hague Conference’s Choice of Law Principles were promulgated because working group
participants viewed the prospect of hard law on the topic to be unlikely in
the short-to-medium term; the working group expressed its hope that this
soft law text would convince domestic legislatures to enact national laws
modeled on the Principles and direct enforcement of choice of law claus133
es.
UNIDROIT’s International Commercial Contract Principles (“ICC
Principles”) fulfill both gap-filling and advocacy soft law purposes. The Introduction to the ICC Principles describes them as providing a “nonlegislative means of the unification or harmonization of law” intended to
134
resemble the American Law Institute Restatement projects. The ICC Prin129.
See supra text accompanying nn. 67–68.
130.
For example, the breadth of the Cape Town Convention has expanded since it first
entered into effect in 2000. Rather than accomplish this expansion through gap-filling soft
laws, UNIDROIT instead relied on a hub-and-spoke mechanism that links protocols governing narrow sorts of mobile equipment types—such as aircraft, rail and rolling stock, spacecraft
and satellites, and mining and agricultural equipment—with the general provisions contained
in the Cape Town Convention. For a discussion of this “hub-and-spoke” approach to the Cape
Town Convention, see, e.g., Goode, supra note 68, passim; Jeffrey Wool, The Next Generation of International Aviation Finance Law: An Overview of the Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment as Applied to Aircraft Equipment, 20
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 499, 509–10 (1999). For a discussion of business interests in promoting the design of the Cape Town Convention, see Durkee, supra note 2, at 292–97.
131.
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (INT’L INST. FOR THE
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, 2016). UNIDROIT’s Principles were issued in 1994 and have
been supplemented over time (2000, 2010, 2016). For other examples of soft law in the interstice of international commercial treaties, see U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
UNCTAD/ICC
Rules
for
Multimodal
Transport
Documents,
U.N.
Doc.
TRADE/WP.4/INF.117/Corr.1 (Jan. 7, 1992).
132.
Compare text associated with supra nn. 75–94 (discussing the gap-filling function
of soft law in the context of enforcement of arbitral awards), with text associated with supra
nn. 95–125 (discussing the advocacy function of soft law on the enforcement and recognition
of judgments).
133.
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, pmbl., June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294;
see also Symeonides, supra note 118.
134.
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS at vii.
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ciples make clear that UNIDROIT directs this text, in true soft law fashion,
to a wide range of national lawmakers, such as legislators and courts, so that
they might implement its recommendations in their domestic law (whether
135
common law or civil codes) and practices. The ICC Principles are also directed to private parties, whether those litigating before national courts or
136
drafting various clauses for inclusion in their international contracts. To
clarify this message to contracting parties, UNIDROIT also couples its ICC
137
Principles with standardized contract clauses for parties’ use.
Although the ICC Principles are directed both toward public and private
actors, private actors were mostly involved in the drafting. The working
groups involved in drafting these Principles included academics, practition138
ers, and judges. Perhaps more tellingly, the ICC Principles were drafted
by experts and ratified by UNIDROIT’s governing council but did not re139
ceive formal approval from UNIDROIT’s member states. UNDROIT’s
approach to the ICC Principles—that is, its failure to seek formal approval
from member states—resembles that followed in its Principles of Reinsur140
ance Contracts but is distinct from that of its other soft law projects, such
as UNIDROIT’s Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions, which were prepared by a working group, approved by the governing
council, and subsequently ratified by creating a group of “governmental ex141
perts.” States’ involvement in the drafting of the Close-Out Netting Prin135.
Id. at pmbl. (“These Principles set forth general rules for international commercial
contracts. They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed
by them. They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by
general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like. They may provide a solution to an
issue raised when it proves impossible to establish the relevant rule of the applicable law.
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments. They may
serve as a model for national and international legislators.”).
136.
Id.
137.
Model Clauses for the Use of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts,
INT’L
INST.
FOR
UNIFICATION
PRIV.
L.,
https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/upicc-model-clauses (last updated
Jan. 30, 2017).
138.
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS at xiii–xiv.
139.
Id. Although their motivation in drafting the ICC Principles in this way is not perfectly clear, UNIDROIT might have been motivated by UNCITRAL’s experience in drafting
its Arbitration Rules, which also were originally promulgated without the political imprimatur
of member states. See supra nn. 92–94.
140.
The UNIDROIT Principles of Reinsurance Contracts are incomplete, although it
expects this work to be finished by 2019. For discussion of the purpose and working methods
followed in preparing the Reinsurance Principles, see Study L – Formulation of Principles of
Reinsurance
Contracts,
INT’L
INST.
FOR
UNIFICATION
PRIV.
L.,
https://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress/reinsurance-contracts (last updated May 8, 2018).
141.
See Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions, INT’L INST. FOR
UNIFICATION PRIV. L., https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/netting (last updated Dec. 11, 2013). For detail on UNIDROIT’s preparatory work preceding its Governing
Council’s ratification of the Close-Out Netting Principles, see Study LXXVIII C - UNIDROIT
Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions - Preparatory Work, INT’L INST.
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ciples may be the result of the market-wide public interest in the enforcement of these financial contracts, confirmed perhaps by UNIDROIT’s mul142
tiple texts on this and related subjects.

4. Regulation of Commercial Conduct, and
International Laws on Such Regulation
National commercial regulation has expanded to address a wider range
of issues over the course of the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries, including consumer protection regulation, environmental regulation, intellectual property regimes, and regulation of securities and other financial markets. As a result, international actors face increasing pressures to enter into
international agreements on some of the topics subject to these regula143
tions. Treaties on regulatory issues present greater sovereignty concerns
than those concerning contracts and other voluntary agreements. As argued
above, international agreement on commercial regulation treads on the sovereignty interests of countries in three ways: the authority of domestic legislatures to enact regulation; the authority of executive branches to design,
implement, and enforce such regulation; and the competence of courts to
144
interpret and enforce these laws. International commercial regulation of
this sort would stomp fully on states’ sovereign feet, not just a toe here and
there.
As might be expected, conventions—hard international laws—on commercial regulation are relatively rare and mostly govern purely international
transactions. Hard international commercial regulation is thus both rare and
limited in scope. Yet, increasingly, global lawmakers (and other international organizations focused on law as the solution to problems of transnational
scale) have proposed international law projects aimed at changing commercial and other local behaviors; have proposed international regulation to accomplish such changes; and have focused their international calls for reform
at the substance of domestic legislation.
This increased demand for commercial and financial law reform is the
consequence of several epochal events beginning in the last decades of the
twentieth century. First, the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent demise of
the Soviet Union meant that a dozen or so former Soviet satellite countries

FOR UNIFICATION PRIV. L.,

https://www.unidroit.org/netting-preparatory-work (describing the
work of the “study group” and “committee of governmental experts”) (last updated July 15,
2014).
142.
UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities,
Oct. 9, 2009, https://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/2009intermediatedsecurities/
convention.pdf; see also UNIDROIT LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES
(2017), https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/legislative-guide.
143.
For discussion of these pressures, see THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF SOFT LAW, supra note 35; Delimatsis, supra
note 33, at 286–87.
144.
See supra Section III.A.
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needed to rewrite their civil codes and other legislation to allow for private
ownership of property and transfers of such ownership, contracting, the
formation of corporations and other legal persons, regulation of banks and
capital markets, and so on. These reform initiatives were mostly concentrated regionally and assisted by acceptance of most of these countries into the
European Union.
Proposals for international regulation also proliferated, second, as a
consequence of the two past global financial crises. Clubs of nations, international financial institutions, and other international organizations first reacted to the Asian financial crisis with proposals to raise the level of the
145
global financial architecture. The G-22 promoted its global financial ar146
chitecture project as a means of preventing future financial crises. In a series of reports published in 1999, the G-22 proposed that its “member”
countries—the twenty-two systemically significant economies of the
world—should reform a lengthy list of financial and economic regulations,
including: banking regulation; capital markets regulations; regulations of
securities and related financial laws; accounting standards; standards for
147
corporate insolvency laws; and so on. The global financial architecture
project impelled numerous IOs, including several global lawmakers, to engage in designing and promulgating international commercial and financial
law reforms. By 2009, when ahistorical levels of default in subprime mortgage markets in the United States began to unravel and undermine financial
markets more broadly, the financial architecture project was nowhere near
complete. However, it grew in importance. The G-8 and G-20 circled back
to the need for strengthening the global financial architecture as a means of
148
tempering the worst effects of the emerging global financial crisis. The
list of financial and commercial regulation that these clubs of nations proposed to internationalize was lengthened, which meant that the list of commercial and financial actors’ behaviors that should be examined and potentially changed also grew longer.
Both monumental shifts in the global political economy prompted demand for reform of international laws governing private, commercial conduct as well as internationally-coordinated reform of national laws governing commercial and financial markets. To be clear, this was more than
simply an increase in the quantity of international law reform proposals.
These were also qualitatively distinct proposals: to “make,” not simply
“find,” commercial laws to govern existing commercial practices; to craft
mandatory rules and mandates that would alter commercial conduct; and for
at least some of this law to be reformed simultaneously as applied both to
international and purely domestic commercial transactions.
145.
HALLIDAY & CARRUTHERS, supra note 16; BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note
1, at 121–25.
146.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 122.
147.
See Block-Lieb, supra note 55.
148.
Cho & Kelly, supra note 55, at 493.
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In implementing these proposals on commercial and financial regulation, global lawmakers have mostly relied on soft international law. For example, UNCITRAL’s work on setting standards for corporate insolvency
laws has resulted in the production of more than a handful of soft law texts:
two draft model laws, a legislative guide with several parts published over
149
multiple years, and one practice guide. Suggestions for a multilateral trea150
ty on cross-border insolvency practice have mostly been rebuffed.
UNCITRAL’s work on secured transactions law reforms also involves only
151
soft law instruments. In addition, UNCITRAL is not alone in drafting international regulations as soft laws. The Financial Stability Board (“FSB”),
working on its own or partnering with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), has promulgated reports, high-level
principles, and other soft law texts on a wide range of financial topics. Various transnational regulatory networks and international professional associations have furthered the work of the FSB and the OECD by publishing
related supplementary texts on these issues. Over time, the G-20 has en152
dorsed dozens of these high-level principles. As a result, a wide range
of soft international laws now exists in these contexts, including
153
corporate governance,
regulation of the securities and capital
154
155
markets, and the financial institutions engaged in these markets.

149.
See e.g., UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 72;
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART THREE: TREATMENT OF
ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN INSOLVENCY, supra note 72; UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON
INSOLVENCY LAW: PART FOUR: DIRECTORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD APPROACHING
INSOLVENCY, supra note 72.
150.
UN Commission on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group V (Insolvency Law)
on Its Forty-Fifth Session, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/803 (May 6, 2014).
151.
See, e.g., UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra
note 127; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
Amendments Adopted (2006), supra note 77.
152.
See, e.g., G20 HIGH-LEVEL PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION
(2016), https://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/G20%20High%20Level%20
Principles%20for%20Digital%20Financial%20Inclusion%20-%20Full%20version-.pdf.
153.
For a discussion of the wide range of soft international law on topics of corporate
governance, see, for example, Klaus J. Haupt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State
of the Art and International Regulation, (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Law Working
Paper No. 170/2011, 2011); Dimity Kingsford Smith, Governing the Corporation: The Role of
‘Soft Regulation,’ 35 U.N.S.W. L.J. 378 (2012); VERONIQUE MAGNIER, COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES passim (2017). For a comparative discussion of national perspectives on corporate governance, see, for example, Martin Gelter, Comparative Corporate Governance: New and Old, in UNDERSTANDING THE COMPANY:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORY 37 (Barnali Choudhury & Martin Petrin eds., 2017).
154.
For a discussion of the emergence and complications involving soft international
laws on the regulation of securities markets, see, for example, Chris Brummer, Post-American
Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327 (2010); Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly,
The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883 (2009). For a
comparison of national laws on securities regulation, see, for example, GLOBAL SECURITIES
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT (Pierre-Henri Conac & Martin Gelter eds., 2018).
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Why has UNCITRAL promulgated only soft international law on corporate insolvency law standards? Do UNCITRAL’s goals for the production
of soft law regarding regulation governing insolvency proceedings differ
from the goals of the G-20 in promoting its global architecture project?
UNCITRAL describes its initial Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law
and the multiple supplements to this Guide as the end of the road as far as
international lawmaking goes; it has not proposed engaging in further work
in the area, for example, by drafting a model law on the substantive corpo156
rate insolvency law. However, this does not mean that the Insolvency
Guide should not be viewed as advocating legislative enactment. Similar to
what the Hague Conference revealed in its publication of Choice of Law
Principles, UNCITRAL aims to speak directly to domestic legislatures and
to persuade them to enact domestic insolvency laws resembling the contents
of its Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.
The G-20 has a different goal in mind. Through this international economic forum, the most economically powerful nations work together to influence networks of transaction regulators so that their actions (whether
regulatory or enforcement conduct) converge with those set out in various
157
high-level principles. Domestic legislation is beside the point. As Chris
Brummer argues, no one national regulator can be expected to “singlehandedly impose its will globally on all actors, all the time, and on its own”
given the increasingly globalized financial markets subject to such regula158
tion. As a result, he argues, international decisionmaking became a “‘ver159
tically’ integrated regulatory system.” It has soft laws “serving as a building block and focal point for coordination” that assist in creating “patterns
of relationships” among heads of states, national regulatory agencies, international financial institutions, inter-governmental organizations, and non155.
For a discussion of transnational regulatory networks of financial regulators and the
soft laws they have promulgated and implemented, see INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND SOFT LAW, supra note 35; BRUMMER, supra note 35; Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law
Dominates International Finance—and not Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623 (2011); Weiss
and Kammel, supra note 35; Hissane Cissé, Alternatives to “Hard” Law in International Financial Regulation: The Experience of the World Bank, 106 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 320 (2012).
156.
UNCITRAL prepared three model laws on the topic of insolvency, but all of these
are procedural. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
INSOLVENCY-RELATED JUDGMENTS (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 1997),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/interim_
mlij.pdf; MLCBI, supra note 113; see also John A. E. Pottow, The Dialogic Aspect of Soft
Law in International Insolvency: Discord, Digression, and Development, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L.
479 (2019). In this way, UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law should be distinguished from its Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, see supra note 127, which has
subsequently been followed by a Model Law on Secured Transactions. UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 2016).
157.
See, e.g., BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 73 (discussing the G-20 and the “range of
legislative products” they put out, “including communiques and declarations”).
158.
BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 61.
159.
Id. at 115.
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state organizations. Soft laws work in this context—they affect and even
alter behaviors in complex financial markets—because they offer opportunities for “socializing” transnational networks of actors and thus institutional161
izing their conduct and practices.
Distinct from gap-filling soft laws like UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules
and Model Law on Commercial Arbitration and UNIDROIT’s ICC Principles, and distinct from the soft law advocacy implicit in the Hague Conference’s Choice of Law Principles, the G-20’s high-level principles and
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide are, thus, intended to prompt dialogue
among international, national, and local actors. Open-ended recommendations or high-level principles drafted by IOs such as UNCITRAL or the FSB
produce a sort of “check list” that invites review of country practices by na162
tional actors. To some extent, this check list intends to be diagnostic,
though it prompts self-diagnosis rather than the more “top-down” judgment
that may engender sovereign nations, whether powerful or weak, to bridle at
163
the intrusion.
The influence of business actors and associations on the drafting of corporate insolvency law standards and in the drafting and implementation of
this soft international law on regulated financial markets and transactions is
now well-established. Halliday and I observed UNCITRAL’s work on the
164
Insolvency Guide in real time and over many years. We found considerable involvement in that process by a range of international professional associations, including the International Bar Association, American Bar Asso-

160.
Id. at 116.
161.
See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 16, at 19 (describing “networks” of “regulators, busineses, and civil society actors” participating “in social contexts
beyond the nation-state” and noting that “[p]articipants in these networks act as intermediaries
among local, national, and transnational governance arenas.”) (citation omitted). This “socializing” may well assist in the institutionalization of TLOs. See id. at 51 (defining “institutionalization” as occurring “when relevant actors clearly understand which norms apply in what
situations and which behaviors will be considered in conformity with those norms.”).
162.
For a discussion of the working methods of the Financial Stability Board, see, for
example, Michael S. Barr, Who’s In Charge of Global Finance?, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971,
1004 (2014) (“The principal mechanism by which a level playing field and intergovernmental
accountability are achieved is peer review—a process that ‘produces social pressures, which
in turn shapes judgments as to whether or not to conform to a given standard.’ ”).
163.
Other soft law texts, like those promulgated by the World Bank or the regional development banks, are sometimes framed as “diagnostic” aids to assist Bank staff in conducting country reviews or to aid domestic ministries of justice in drafting national legislation. For
a guide to the contents of such texts, see JOSÉ GUILHERME REIS & THOMAS FAROLE, TRADE
COMPETITIVENESS DIAGNOSTIC TOOLKIT (2012). These diagnostic tools directly provide a
sort of check list for staff working on behalf of these international financial institutions
(“IFIs”), but, because these diagnostic tools are made publicly available, states, too, can access the check lists in an effort to excel when diagnostic work subsequently gets done by IFI
staff.
164.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 1.
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ciation, INSOL International, and International Insolvency Institute, alt166
hough no trade groups. This access by professional associations is distinct
from capture in that we also observed a strong Secretariat at UNCITRAL
that repeatedly protected member and observer state delegations from con167
duct by non-state actors that crossed the line. Indeed, state delegations
were aware of the close working relationship between members of the Secretariat and delegates in various non-state delegations. When France raised
objections to UNCITRAL regarding these “methods of work,” member
states ultimately reaffirmed their support for the assistance that these “ex168
perts” provided to the international civil servants.
Halliday and I have not observed the workings of the FSB or OECD, on
the other hand, and there is limited empirical study of these “black box169
es.” Nonetheless, several general observations are worth making in this
context. Because the substance of this soft international law involves commercial and financial practices that are regulated at the national level or are
in some sense subject to mandatory legislation, we should presume that
businesses have already sought to influence this regulation at the national
level through lobbying and related activities. As noted above, international
lawmaking may provide businesses with a “second bite at the regulated apple” and, depending on the market interests at stake with this sort of international regulation, may prompt businesses’ efforts to seek to reverse the ef170
fects of national regulation. But self-regulatory organizations have not
165.
Id. at 187 (noting that “professionals played outsized roles in the inner core of
lawmakers [within UNCITRAL]. Delegations of professionals (International Bar Association,
INSOL International, American Bar Association, International Insolvency Institute) to the
Insolvency Working Group were arguably the critical technical drivers of that deliberative
process.”).
166.
For a discussion of the absence of business or financial actors or associations—
despite the presence of their proxies in the form of insolvency professionals (that is, international organizations of such professionals), see Terence Halliday, Susan Block-Lieb, & Bruce
Carruthers, Missing Debtors: National Lawmaking and Global Norm-Making of Corporate
Bankruptcy Regimes, in A DEBTOR WORLD 236 (Ralph Brubaker et al. eds., 2012).
167.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at 204 (“All working group secretaries
and most participants contest the characterization of an ‘expert group as a smoke-filled
room.’ ”).
168.
BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 1, at ch. 8.
169.
For a tentative study of the global financial architecture project, see FIN. STABILITY
BD., IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE G20 FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORMS: 28
NOV. 2014 4TH ANNUAL REPORT (2018), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
P281118-1.pdf.
170.
Cf. Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201, 204 (2017) (arguing that “businesses are able to secretly gain access to international officials” because rules of
international access to IOs are unsophisticated and in need of reform); Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 765–84 (describing soft law produced in the context of powerful states that
agree on a common policy, powerful states that disagree, and weak states that disagree, finding complementary soft law strategies in the case of agreement between powerful states but
antagonistic strategies in other cases; adding businesses’ interests to the mix only heightens
the likelihood of such antagonism).
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drafted these soft laws alone; organizations of numerous sub-state actors,
such as national regulators, have joined with inter-governmental organizations to reach consensus through a procedure described as “socializing”
171
along a “vertically-integrated regulatory system.” It is hard to imagine
capture by business actors of such a diffuse network of actors, but, of
course, it is difficult to observe hundreds of “black boxes” and that may be
precisely the goal of such fragmentation.

C. A Return to the Big Picture
Soft laws play important roles in the development of international
commercial law—some complementary and some antagonistic. Rather than
simply focusing on interactions between hard and soft international laws, or
on consensus or dissensus among states’ interests in such laws, this Article
looked at the involvement and influence of business interests in the making
of international commercial law and particularly at the role soft laws play in
this context.
In the realm of international commercial and financial law, soft laws
play at least three distinct roles: gap-filling, advocacy, and socializing. Iden172
tification of these roles is not itself novel, but discussion of them through
the lens of business influence’s impact on these functions does lend a distinct perspective. Although we may discuss these functions without reference to businesses’ access to international efforts to craft agreed-upon
standards for conduct in global commercial and financial markets, this discussion would ignore an important reality: Just as “business entities have
become deeply involved in designing, negotiating, and implementing a
173
number of treaties in the private law,” they are also embedded in designing, negotiating, and implementing the soft law governing international
174
commercial law. Private, commercial actors’ involvement is not limited,
moreover, to the process of global lawmaking itself; businesses and the professionals, professional associations, and IOs that represent their interests
are also engaged, after the fact, both in terms of incremental work to “harden” these soft standards in subsequent rounds of lawmaking and in implementing these standards with practices “on the ground.” Although sovereign
states might be expected to focus on the absence of obligation in soft international law, regardless of its function, autonomous, non-state actors are
more likely to emphasize soft laws’ effectiveness in coordinating activity,
its flexibility in the face of changing markets, technology and the resulting

171.
BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 115 (“Broad-based and more-political institutions set
agendas and assess gaps, whereas more-technocratic sectoral and specialist standards setters
promulgate best practices and, in some instances, granularized rules.”).
172.
See, e.g., Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 722–27.
173.
Durkee, supra note 2, at 266 (emphasis added).
174.
See supra Part III.
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political economy, and the legitimacy it provides in validating otherwise
175
purely private action.
When businesses seek to influence the adoption and implementation of
gap-filling soft international laws, they bring their distinct capabilities to the
table. Gap-filling soft laws are understood to extend the subject matter reach
of pre-existing hard law instruments with reference to topics implicated in a
treaty but left unsaid. The drafting of gap-filling soft laws involves the
drafting of more precise detail and information that got left out of the treaty
in order to ensure international agreement on an enforceable obligation. To
emphasize gap-filling soft laws merely as producing greater detail in the international commercial law on a topic is to focus solely on the implementation of this form of soft law through the subsequent production of some
harder sort of international law. Yet businesses hold a distinct edge in the
implementation of gap-fillers in that this sort of soft law often is relied on
by private parties in constructing their contracts and possibly also in standardized networks of contracts. UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules, for example, set unenforceable standards for the conduct of arbitration proceedings.
This guidance may thereafter become enforceable when the contents of the
Rules are incorporated into arbitration clauses in private contracts. The contracts themselves are enforceable under national laws of general application,
while the arbitral awards that result from the arbitration proceedings committed to in such contracts are themselves likely to be enforced as a result of
the New York Convention.
Private actors’ involvement and influence also affect the implementation of soft law intended to prompt socializing an area of financial regulato176
ry law. To be sure, soft laws on the conduct of central banking practices
will mostly be socialized by public actors charged with regulating these
177
functions under national laws. But, to a varying degree across national
regulatory landscapes, private actors’ involvement may well be critical to
the success of the socializing of the global standards set out in soft international law, especially where central banking functions are held by private
banks or where self-regulation governs financial markets. Public and private
actors coordinate their interactions through IOs with “highly developed”

175.
For a more general discussion of the interaction of public and private incentives in
international lawmaking, see Jürgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the Economy
Commercial Law as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
703, 719 (2008) (looking to “identify the conditions that favor the emergence of private rules
as well as those that make state law indispensable.”).
176.
For a discussion of the concept of “modeling” and the interaction of epistemic
communities of like-minded actors, see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 19, at 539; see
also Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 726 (discussing the importance of Braithwaite and
Drahos to understanding the complementary relationship between hard and soft international
law and regulation).
177.
Barr, supra note 162, at 992 (detailing the working methods of the Financial Stability Board as involving both development of independent reports and “ensuring global compliance” in part through “peer reviews on a country-by-country and regional basis”).
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governance structures. Together the “vertically-integrated regulatory system” that Brummer likens the global financial architecture project to may
work on three distinct levels, as suggested by Transnational Legal Order
179
theory: it may vertically link international and transnational organizations
not only to national regulators but also commercial and financial entities
180
“on the ground.” While socializing soft laws may interact with existing, or
lead toward eventual, hard international laws, they need not. Where the socializing occurs among tightly bound epistemic communities of actors, there
is little need for the formal obligations that hard law would bring. Their
commonalties converge action toward a singular goal despite the absence of
a credible threat of enforcement.
Finally, soft laws aimed at advocating the need for further international
or national laws on a topic may also rely on a combination of public and
private action. The Hague Conference promulgated its Choice of Law Principles as soft law and not as a draft treaty because preliminary work on the
topic convinced the Conference that the time was not ripe for such a convention. It also promulgated the Principles because, notwithstanding this
lack of state interest in pursuing the topic, private parties and organizations
representing various business interests persisted in the commercial benefits
of predictable enforcement of contract clauses choosing the applicable governing law. This divergence between states’ sovereign and businesses’ au181
tonomous interests were negotiated through the soft law format.

178.
BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 116 (“Despite their soft law foundations, the standardsetting bodies that drive standard setting and international agendas typically possess highly
developed institutional structures, each with its own mix of membership rules, decision rules,
and decision-making processes.”).
179.
For a discussion of the international, national, and local coordination and concordance envisioned by TLO theory, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 16, at 42–
48.
180.
See, e.g., Eric Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators: The Emergence and Limits of
the Transnational Financial Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note
16, at 231–57, 249 (“Major shifts in the content of regulation in the period – including the
new emphasis on ‘macroprudential’ regulatory philosophy – can be attributed in large part to
new ideas and consensus formation among experts in transgovernmental networks, many of
which have become more skeptical of neo-liberal ideas in finance, as well as of transnational
private lobbying.”) (citation omitted); Carola Westermeier, The Bank of International Settlements as a Think Tank for Financial Policy-Making, 37 POL’Y & SOC’Y 170, 183 (2018) (analyzing the Bank of International Settlements both “as a host to central bankers, financial politicians and other actors in financial governance and as a provider of knowledge to these
networks”).
181.
Advocacy through soft law can be both positive (pressing for the subsequent adoption of some harder international law) and negative (making the case for revisions to or reversals from existing international law instruments). For examples and analysis of antagonistic
soft international laws, see Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 9, at 788–98.
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Conclusion
Empirical research increasingly demonstrates that businesses’ influence
on international commercial law may involve more than simply pressing the
State Department or a foreign ministry to pursue their interests in international negotiations. In the wake of these findings, this Article sought to “update” theoretical understanding regarding the primacy of states’ involvement in the making and implementation of international law by focusing on
one sort of international law—specifically, international commercial law.
The Article explored the role that businesses and other private actors play in
the construction and implementation of these international texts. In theorizing about private, commercial actors’ roles in these processes, it emphasized
and compared the distinct interests and abilities of public and private actors
in the choice between hard and soft international law.
The conventional way to conceive of business access in the lawmaking
context is as lobbying or legislative influence. With this depiction, domestic
businesses press the state in which they reside to design international
agreements on topics of commercial law consistent with their commercial
interests. But, while commercial actors may well look to influence global
lawmaking in this way, indirectly through the portal of state action, studies
show that businesses also make their transnational commercial interests
known more directly to global lawmakers. That businesses exercise their
influence in both national and international settings suggests that hard and
soft international laws can serve a distinct purpose for states than for businesses, depending on the type of international commercial law at issue. It
also suggests that the decision to promulgate soft or hard international
commercial laws may not depend exclusively on state-centric factors or on
commercial interests filtered through a state’s perception of its national interests.
Although international law is conventionally divided between public
and private, between procedural and substantive, this Article described
commercial law as falling into a three-part typology: (i) judicial enforcement of private contracts, judgments, or arbitral awards; (ii) “bottom up”
legislative codification of commercial practices; and (iii) “top down” regulation of commerce. When viewed this way, the role of business in influencing the production of international commercial law should not be limited to
consideration of activities that resemble lobbying. This sort of influence
pertains to legislative or regulatory proposals, but not all commercial law is
regulatory in format. Businesses may exert influence through contracts, including networks of standardized contracts, and through their dispute resolution practices, including transnational litigation. These additional forms of
business influence on commercial law deserve distinct consideration.
This Article identified three purposes of soft international commercial
law: gap-filling; advocacy, and socializing functions. It linked soft law’s
gap-filling function to international laws that resemble common law or code
approaches in domestic commercial law. Its socializing function, by con-
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trast, was applied predominantly to regulatory commercial law contexts in
that soft law can guide TRNs of regulators and civil society toward consensus on a desired range of administrative practices. Soft law advocacy looks
not only to plan for subsequent lawmaking within international organizations but also at national and local decisionmaking: domestic legislators,
domestic courts, and others involved in the design and conduct of dispute
resolution mechanisms.
States may object less to the influence of private interests in the context
of soft international commercial law than hard law. Soft international law
may look redundant or harmless because it is not “legalized” according to
Abbott and Snidal. Yet, perhaps states should be warier of business interests’ access to the making of soft international laws, although soft laws lack
legalization. Resolution of the divergences between state and non-state interests by means of soft law channels may obscure business influence, making it harder to detect, and that may be the point.

